University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2020

Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine Print Fraud
Roseanna Sommers

University of Michigan Law School, rosesomm@umich.edu

Meirav Furth-Matzkin

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2711

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Furth-Matzkin and Roseanna Sommers. "Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine Print Fraud."
Stanford Law Review 72, no. 3 (2020): 503-60.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Stanford Law Review
Volume 72

March 2020

ARTICLE

Consumer Psychology and
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Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers*
Abstract. This Article investigates consumers’ beliefs about contracts that are formed as a
result of fraud. Across four studies, we asked lay survey respondents to judge scenarios in
which sellers use false representations to induce consumers to buy products or services. In
each case, the false representations are directly contradicted by the written terms of the
contract, which the consumers sign without reading. Our findings reveal that lay
respondents, unlike legally trained respondents, believe that such agreements are
consented to and will be enforced as written, despite the seller’s material deception.
Importantly, fine print discourages consumers from wanting to take legal action, initiate
complaints, or damage the deceptive firm’s reputation by telling others what happened.
We find that the presence of deception during the contract formation process has little
effect on consumers’ beliefs about whether the contract will be or should be enforced as
written. While informing consumers about antideception consumer protection laws can
alter their perceptions of fine-print fraud, we find that such information does not
completely counteract the psychological effect of the fine print.
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Taken together, these findings suggest that consumers who would otherwise complain
about being cheated become demoralized when they discover they have signed a contract
whose terms contradict what they were promised. We posit that this occurs because many
people are intuitive contract formalists: They assume that all contracts—even those
induced by fraud—are binding. The implications, we argue, are that prevailing methods of
addressing deceptive business practices, which often put the onus on victims of fraud to
complain, fail to take account of consumer psychology.
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Introduction
A defining feature of modern-day contracts is that almost no one reads the
terms before signing or clicking through.1 Consumers are confronted with an
impossible amount of fine print in their daily lives, and it is neither practical
nor efficient for them to read all of their contracts thoroughly.2
Widespread non-readership leaves consumers open to exploitation by
underhanded firms. When consumers do not read their contracts, unscrupulous
sellers can exaggerate or lie outright about their products and services while
contradicting, qualifying, or disclaiming these assertions in the fine print.3 For
1. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:

THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 79-93 (2014) (surveying evidence that
consumers are often unable to read fine print carefully and arguing against regulation
focused on increasing disclosure in contracts); Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The NoReading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546-48, 566, 582 (2014)
(responding to the overwhelming number of terms and disclosures consumers
encounter); Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-5 (2014) (finding that only one or two
out of every thousand retail software buyers examine the license agreement at all
before making the purchase and proposing that an “informed minority” is unlikely to
prevent sellers from inserting one-sided terms into standardized agreements);
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
165, 168 (2011) (analyzing the browsing behavior of 47,399 U.S. households and finding
that requiring online software buyers to click on an “I agree” box did not meaningfully
increase readership of license agreements).
2. See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 10-11 (“How many men with
prostate cancer try to decipher their prospects of cure and of side effects with each of
the principal treatments, much less learn and remember enough to use the data? Nearly
nobody, since patients do not read, understand, and remember much simpler medical
information.”); Richard A. Epstein, Contract, Not Regulation: UCITA and High-Tech
Consumers Meet Their Consumer Protection Critics, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE
OF THE “INFORMATION ECONOMY” 205, 227 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (“[I]t seems clear that
most consumers—of whom I am proudly one—never bother to read these terms
anyhow: we . . . adopt a strategy of ‘rational ignorance’ to economize on the use of our
time.”); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 563-64 (2008) (estimating that if people
actually read privacy policies, it would take them, on average, 244 hours per year,
amounting to $781 billion in lost productivity); Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little
Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding
of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015) (reporting that less than half of
survey respondents knew whether the contract they had just read included an
arbitration clause, and that most of those who did know failed to understand the legal
implications of the clause).
3. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the
Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 55, 57
(2013) (discussing situations in which the nondrafting party claims that the drafting
party made oral promises contrary to the written contract, and coining the term “Borat
problem” to describe such situations after litigation presenting this fact pattern); Debra
Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths
footnote continued on next page

506

Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine-Print Fraud
72 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2020)

instance, the marketing company Vertrue enrolled consumers in “buying club
memberships” over the phone, offering to send enrollees a $25 gift card in the
mail as part of a “free trial” and promising that membership would be “riskfree.”4 Unbeknownst to consumers, their credit cards or bank accounts would
be perpetually charged monthly membership fees if they failed to contact
Vertrue to cancel within a designated trial period.5 The details about these
charges, as well as instructions for how to cancel the membership, were buried
in the fine print.6 Vertrue perpetuated this fraudulent scheme (among others)
for over two decades before it was ordered to pay over $30 million in
restitution to over 500,000 consumers for billing them without their
knowledge.7
Cases involving “fraud and fine print” schemes like Vertrue’s have recently
garnered attention from scholars,8 enforcement agencies,9 and consumer
advocates.10 Experts estimate that over 25 million Americans each year are
victimized by fraud.11 Deceptive business practices are especially likely to
target low-income, minority, and elderly adults.12

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 624-25 (2009) (arguing
against enforcement of no-reliance clauses when the contract conflicts with the seller’s
prior statements, except when terms are negotiated by sophisticated parties in
business-to-business transactions).
See State v. Vertrue, Inc., 834 N.W.2d 12, 18-19, 21, 34-40 (Iowa 2013) (holding that a
seller violated the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act when oral representations contradicted
fine-print terms); see also Matthew Sturdevant, Connecticut Company Liable for 20 Years
of Consumer Fraud in Iowa, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 25, 2010), https://perma.cc/
Y9BD-FP2G.
Sturdevant, supra note 4.
Vertrue, 834 N.W.2d at 42.
See id. at 33; Sturdevant, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 3, at 54-55; Stark & Choplin, supra note 3, at 617-21.
See, e.g., infra note 71 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Press Release, Better Bus. Bureau, Consumer Fraud Task Force Warns Consumers
to Be Careful When Shopping Online (Aug. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/KAQ5-QSFK
(advising consumers to read the fine print to avoid falling prey to fraudulent or unfair
business practices); Bob Sullivan, It Pays to Read the Fine Print in Contracts, AARP (Sept. 9,
2019), https://perma.cc/5G7V-Y3QW (educating AARP constituents about how the
fine print of contracts may contradict certain advertised aspects of transactions or
reveal they are too good to be true).
See KEITH B. ANDERSON, FTC, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011: THE
THIRD FTC SURVEY, at i (2013), https://perma.cc/RNA9-79SP.
See Protecting Seniors from Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong.
29 (2000) (statement of Rolando Berrelez, Rep. on Consumer Protection, FTC); FTC,
COMBATING FRAUD IN AFRICAN AMERICAN AND LATINO COMMUNITIES: THE FTC’S
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PLAN 1-2, 1 n.6 (2016), https://perma.cc/A4J4-S4PD.
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Few consumers will notice at the time of signing that they have been
misled about the terms of a transaction; many will realize this only after the
fact when they are hit with a nasty surprise. At that point, they may revisit the
contract and discover a fine-print clause that contradicts what they were told.
Previous commentary has assumed that consumers will complain at this point
because they were deceived about a material aspect of the transaction.13 This
Article challenges that prevailing wisdom. It shows, on the contrary, that the
inclusion of fraudulent fine print leads laypeople to assume that they are stuck
with what they signed.
Across four studies, we presented lay respondents with fraud-and-fineprint cases, in which a seller induces a consumer to buy a product or service by
making a false representation. The false representation is directly contradicted
by the written terms of the contract, which the consumer signs without reading.
Using this experimental paradigm, Study 1 shows that laypeople, unlike legally
trained individuals, strongly believe that fraudulent fine print is consented to
and will be enforced against the deceived party.14 Study 2 shows, moreover,
that the presence of fraudulent fine print discourages consumers from wanting
to take legal action, complaining to the company, or posting a bad review
online.15 Remarkably, Study 3 finds that the presence or absence of seller
deception has little effect on laypeople’s intuitions about whether fine-print
terms will be, or should be, enforced: Consumers seem to focus on what the
contract says, not on whether the formation process was marred by fraud.16
Finally, Study 4 shows that providing respondents with information about
antideception consumer protection laws leads them to question the legal status

13. See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Social Media and the Rise in Consumer Bargaining Power, 14 U.

PA. J. BUS. L. 661 (2012) (noting the rise in consumer self-help remedies using social
media); Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito, The Death of Contracts, 52 DUQ. L. REV.
345, 395 (2014) (“Today, ubiquitous ratings systems on popular web sites, sometimes
with free and open (and often virulent) commentary, allow individual consumers to
extract a measure of vengeance on the businesses that they believe have wronged
them.”); Eric H. Steele, Fraud, Dispute, and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer
Complaints, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1107, 1108-10 (1975) (noting that consumers faced with
unfair or fraudulent business practices may feel they are treated unfairly and therefore
demand action be taken to rectify the situation). See generally Susan S. Silbey, Review
Essay, Who Speaks for the Consumer? Nader ’s No Access to Law and Best ’s When
Consumers Complain, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 429, 434 (1984) (reviewing NO ACCESS
TO LAW: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM (Laura Nader ed., 1980); and
ARTHUR BEST, WHEN CONSUMERS COMPLAIN (1981)) (“Agencies are often passive,
relying on consumer initiative to combat systematic product and service failures, as
well as organized fraud and deception.”).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
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of fine-print fraud, although such information does not completely counteract
their formalistic intuition that whatever the contract says is enforceable.17
These findings unsettle conventional wisdom about how consumers react
to fraudulently induced contracts. Previous scholarship has tended to assume
that fine print is “at worst, harmless.”18 Robert Hillman, for example, has
argued that “consumers are as unlikely to read terms after a transaction as
during one.”19 Other scholars have countered that consumers do read their
contracts, often once they discover problems and must decide what to do.20 But
these commentators make a second assumption: that fine print empowers
consumers. Shmuel Becher and Esther Unger-Aviram, for instance, assert that
“reading the contract ex post can prove highly beneficial,” because consumers
“become familiar with their rights and obligations and . . . respond accordingly.”21
Namely, they expect that consumers who read the fine print ex post will begin
negotiating with sellers over the terms they have already signed.22
Commentators expect that sellers, in turn, will be willing to appease aggrieved
buyers because they will be motivated to preserve their reputations.23
17. See infra Part V.
18. See Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing,

78 U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 107 (2011).
19. Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard
20.

21.

22.

23.

Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 844 (2006).
See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0 : Standard Form
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
303, 315 (2008) (arguing that some consumers may be especially incentivized to read
their contracts ex post if, for instance, “the product was not what the vendor
represented it to be, it arrived late or damaged, [or] it malfunctioned”).
Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts:
Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199,
206 (2010) (suggesting that consumers read contracts ex post in order to better
understand their rights and remedies, and to thereafter comport with or seek to
modify the terms).
See id. at 208 (“[W]hereas it is basically true that contracting parties do not negotiate
[standard form contracts] ex ante, actual contracting around the [standard form
contract] content is more likely to take place at the ex post stage.”); Jason Scott
Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts
Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857,
866 (2006) (noting that “there is systematic survey evidence . . . of widespread negotiation
around standard-form payment terms” involving hospital bills).
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 830 (2006) (suggesting that “reputational
considerations” may “induce the seller to treat the buyer fairly even when such
treatment is not contractually required”); Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for
Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 977 (2005) (“On the seller side, sellers who
attempt to capture the marginal buyer, who face reputational constraints, or who
cannot distinguish readers from nonreaders, will face competitive pressures inconsistent
with efforts to exploit nonreaders.”); Johnston, supra note 22, at 858 (“In practice, acting
footnote continued on next page
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This Article provides evidence for the opposite conclusion. We argue that
fine print may disempower consumers who read their contracts ex post. This is
because consumers may become demoralized by contractual language and are
likely to blame themselves for failing to read at the time of signing. We provide
evidence that ordinary consumers are disinclined to renegotiate with sellers,
and indeed express little appetite for complaining or even telling others what
happened.24 Thus, consumers’ formalistic intuitions about contracts may lead
them to “lump it”—that is, absorb the loss—rather than take action against
deceptive sellers.
This insight carries legal ramifications. To Lucian Bebchuk and Richard
Posner, the possibility that consumers will engage in ex post negotiations
diminishes the need to intervene in lopsided bargains. “[S]eemingly one-sided
terms may not be one-sided after all,” they explain, because such terms can be
altered after the fact and “implemented in a balanced way.”25 Becher and
Unger-Aviram similarly believe that the phenomenon of ex post negotiating,
when “accompanied by sellers’ reputational concerns, might deter sellers from
drafting egregiously one-sided contracts” or from insisting that consumers
abide by such one-sided language.26 “Generally speaking,” these commentators
assert, “this potential phenomenon also renders legal intervention less necessary.”27

24.

25.

26.
27.

through its agents, a firm will often provide benefits to consumers who complain
beyond those that its standard form obligates it to provide . . . .”).
See infra Part III.B (showing that the inclusion of fine-print terms causes consumers to
refrain from complaining, telling others what happened, posting reviews online, or
otherwise taking action in response to being defrauded). For similar findings in the
context of unenforceable contract terms, see Meirav Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful
Effects of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Experimental Evidence, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1031 (2019)
[hereinafter Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable Contract Terms]
(providing original experimental evidence showing that tenants are significantly less
likely to complain, search for online information, or take action against a defiant
landlord after reading a contract containing unenforceable contract terms); and
Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Evidence
from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 38-40 (2017) [hereinafter
Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms] (providing
survey evidence showing that tenants consult their leases when a rental problem arises,
and often refrain from taking action or complaining even though these contracts
frequently contain unenforceable clauses).
Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 23, at 828-30; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts
as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 706 (“[O]stensibly ‘unfair’ contract terms
might actually constitute efficient risk allocation mechanisms for policing the
behavior of contractual parties who are not easily disciplined by markets or whose
opportunistic behavior cannot easily be detected.”).
Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 21, at 208.
Id. But see Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 23, at 834 (suggesting that courts “would do
well to take a hard line in enforcing the terms of one-sided consumer contracts in the
absence of evidence of fraud”).
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We argue, to the contrary, that deterrence through consumer-initiated
ex post negotiations is unlikely when the fine print contradicts what consumers
were told. Accordingly, sellers may be unlikely to suffer the hypothesized
reputational costs—let alone legal or financial costs—for their deception. Thus,
legal intervention may be warranted to protect consumers from deceptive
business practices. Moreover, the findings raise questions about the
effectiveness of legal interventions and consumer protection regimes that put
the onus on victims of fraud to challenge the enforceability of their standard
form contracts.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe the problem of fineprint fraud in consumer markets and survey the current regulatory efforts to
curb such practices. In Parts II through V, we report the findings of four
experimental studies that explore consumers’ reactions to fine-print fraud.
In Part VI, we evaluate various legal approaches to addressing the problem
of fine-print fraud in light of our findings. We note that while many
commentators have lamented the legal and financial barriers to consumers’
pursuit of litigation against unscrupulous businesses, our findings suggest that
consumer psychology may play an independent, and underappreciated, role.
I.

Fine-Print Fraud in Consumer Markets

The fraud-and-fine-print scheme is a common form of deceptive business
practice. In this scenario, a consumer is tricked into signing a contract that
contains a statement qualifying or disclaiming promises made by the seller. For
example, the fine print may include a “no-reliance” or “no-representation”
clause stipulating that the consumer acknowledges that the company and its
salespeople have made no representations to the consumers other than what is
contained in the contract.28 In other cases, the fine print can directly contradict
the seller’s prior assertions.29
28. See, e.g., MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2005)

(anticipating that antireliance statements would be enforced in Delaware courts in
order “to bar a subsequent fraud claim”); Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting that a plaintiff assured a seller that he had not relied on prior oral
statements, but subsequently sued with allegations that “rest[ed] on [the defendant’s]
oral statements”); Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. 1959)
(discussing a no-representation clause in the context of a misrepresentation case).
29. See, e.g., Williams v. Spitzer Autoworld Canton, L.L.C., 913 N.E.2d 410, 417 (Ohio 2009)
(discussing a car buyer’s allegation that a dealer promised him a trade-in allowance
$1,000 greater than the amount specified in writing). Outside the consumer context, see
Evenson v. Quantum Industries, Inc., 687 N.W.2d 241, 245 (N.D. 2004), which involved a
writing that allegedly directly contradicted the defendant’s oral representation that he
would not sell a product line; and Ungerleider v. Gordon, 214 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir.
2000), noting an “obvious inconsistency” between a written agreement and an alleged
oral promise to grant an investor additional shares of stock.
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The American Law Institute’s in-progress Restatement of Consumer
Contracts singles out fraud-and-fine-print cases as a significant problem in
consumer markets. The latest draft identifies “a pattern in which the business
draws the consumer in with a false or misleading affirmation of fact or
promise, which the business then attempts to undo or qualify in a less
noticeable manner.”30 It lists examples such as “represent[ing] that a service is
covered by an extensive warranty when the standard contract terms include
broad disclaimers of implied warranties.”31 Unlike cases in which sellers hide
one-sided terms in the fine print that goes unread, fraud-and-fine-print cases
involve an active misrepresentation on the part of the seller before the
transaction is consummated.
Fraud-and-fine-print situations present a problem not only for the
individual victims of fraud but also for aggregate social welfare. From an
economic perspective, efficient markets require that consumers enter only
those transactions that make them better off—or at least no worse off.32
Consumers need accurate information in order to determine whether a
prospective arrangement is beneficial. When consumers are materially misled,
they may unwittingly enter contracts that make them worse off. The resulting
agreements may decrease social welfare in the aggregate as well, as when the
deceived consumer’s losses exceed the deceptive seller’s gains.33 Thus, fraud in
consumer contracts may harm the functioning of the marketplace and reduce
net social welfare.34
Market competition is supposed to take care of these kinds of deceptive
business practices by punishing firms that disappoint consumers. Indeed, firms
typically have an incentive to meet consumer expectations, because competitive
forces usually shift sales away from dishonest firms and toward firms that
meet consumer demands.35 But market forces generally cannot discipline
sellers whose products are purchased infrequently or who are otherwise
30. RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 6 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 2019).
31. Id.
32. For a similar analysis, see Korobkin, supra note 3, at 60 (“[C]ontracts should satisfy the

Pareto efficiency criteria, which provide that at least one party is made better off by
the agreement, and no party is made worse off.”).
33. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (9th ed. 2014); STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 329-30 (2004).
34. Of course, even if fraud reduces net welfare, a separate question is what amount of
resources should be devoted to deterring it. The optimal level of deterrence will
depend on weighing the benefits of preventing fraud against the costs of enforcement,
a subject that this Article does not address.
35. See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 23, at 830 (suggesting that when markets provide this
control, “[a] seller has little or no incentive to behave opportunistically because if he
does, he will suffer a loss of reputation, which is a cost”).
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unconcerned about repeat business. Consequently, absent sufficient enforcement,
underhanded sellers may be incentivized to engage in fraud.
A. Legal Responses
When competition alone cannot deter sellers from behaving dishonestly,
legal intervention can serve as an important corrective measure.36 Such
measures have generally been uncontroversial; even staunch libertarians see
deliberate deception as an “easy case” for legal intervention.37 As Richard
Epstein explains, “as a general matter, no social good can derive from the
systematic production of misinformation.”38 He observes that fraud has always
been an important limitation on the “freedom of contract” ideal:
The classical conception of contract at common law had as its first premise the
belief that private agreements should be enforced in accordance with their terms.
That premise of course was subject to important qualifications. Promises
procured by fraud . . . were not generally enforced by the courts . . . .39

The common law doctrine of fraud empowers a contracting party to void
an agreement to the extent that he or she had been induced by fraud to enter
into it.40 This doctrine is generally recognized as an exception to the parol
evidence rule, which provides that a written agreement supersedes any
inconsistent or conflicting terms expressed in prior exchanges between the
parties.41 Put differently, the parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic
evidence when the signing party alleges that the other engaged in common law
fraud.42 Moreover, courts often find that contractual exculpatory clauses, or
36. For a similar argument, see J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, FTC Consumer

37.
38.
39.
40.

41.
42.

Protection at 100 : 1970s Redux or Protecting Markets to Protect Consumers?, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 2157, 2160 (2015) (“When competition alone cannot punish or deter seller
dishonesty, private legal rights can mitigate these problems . . . .”).
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293,
298 n.14 (1975).
Id. at 298.
Id. at 293.
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (rendering a
contract voidable if a contracting party justifiably relied on “a fraudulent or a material
representation by the other party”); accord RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 6
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 2019).
See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(1).
Id. § 214 (“Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption
of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish . . . illegality, fraud, . . . or other
invalidating cause.”); accord RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 6 cmt. 8(c); see
also Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. Nat’l Metal Abrasive Co., 101 F.2d 489, 491 (6th Cir.
1939) (finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded it had been “induced to
conclude an agreement by fraudulent concealment of existing facts and by promises,
implied if not expressed, made with no present intention of performing,” and
concluding that “[i]n the allegations of inducement we find no challenge to the terms of
footnote continued on next page
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other types of clauses disclaiming or qualifying a seller’s prior representations,
generally do not bar consumers from bringing fraud claims, because “[t]o
reflexively disallow parol evidence on the basis of such disclaimer[s] is to
reward the ingenuity of draftsmen at the expense of sound public policy, and
to invite sale agents, armed with impenetrable contracts, to lie to their
customers.”43 As the Delaware Court of Chancery has explained, “[a]
perpetrator of fraud cannot close the lips of his innocent victim by getting him
blindly to agree in advance not to complain against it.”44
Indeed, the use of no-reliance clauses has long been a source of
consternation in cases involving deception. As far back as 1894, the New York
Court of Appeals noted that if no-reliance clauses were enforced in cases of
alleged fraud, it would “break down every barrier which the law has erected
against fraudulent dealing.”45 The court wrote:
It is difficult to conceive that such a clause could ever be suggested by a party to a
contract, unless there was in his own mind at least a lingering doubt as to
the honesty and integrity of his conduct. . . . Public policy and morality are both
ignored if such an agreement can be given effect in a court of justice.46

It seems, then, that consumers plausibly have legal remedies in fraud-andfine-print cases.47 In addition, beyond contract and tort common law doctrines,
all fifty states have enacted consumer protection statutes, known as Unfair and

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

the contract impermissible under the parol evidence rule”); Riverisland Cold Storage,
Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 323-25 (Cal. 2013) (allowing
evidence of promissory fraud that is at variance with the terms of the writing despite
the parol evidence rule); Cirillo v. Slomin’s Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 759, 763-69 (Sup. Ct. 2003)
(allowing some parol evidence to be introduced in a fraud case despite contractual
disclaimers and waivers in the fine print); ISG State Operations, Inc. v. Nat’l Heritage
Ins. Co., 234 S.W.3d 711, 719 n.11 (Tex. App. 2007) (noting that, despite the parol
evidence rule, “[e]xtrinsic evidence is admissible to show (1) the execution of a written
agreement was procured by fraud, (2) an agreement was to become effective only upon
certain contingencies, or (3) the parties’ true intentions if the writing is ambiguous”).
See, e.g., Cirillo, 768 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
Webster v. Palm Beach Ocean Realty Co., 139 A. 457, 460 (Del. Ch. 1927) (holding the
defendant liable after “material” fraudulent misrepresentations).
Bridger v. Goldsmith, 38 N.E. 458, 459 (N.Y. 1894).
Id.
See, e.g., Riverisland Cold Storage, 291 P.3d at 323-25; Bauer v. Giannis, 834 N.E.2d 952, 960
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that an “as is” clause in a real estate contract was “not a
defense to the fraud claims”); Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Grps., Inc., 683 N.W.2d 807, 81213 (Minn. 2004); Cirillo, 768 N.Y.S.2d at 768; Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 320
S.E.2d 286, 291 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), aff ’d, 331 S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 1985); Smith v. Scott
Lewis Chevrolet, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). See also generally Stark &
Choplin, supra note 3 (collecting cases on both sides of the question). But see, e.g.,
Tirapelli v. Advanced Equities, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(determining that a no-reliance clause precluded an argument for fraud in a transaction
between “sophisticated business people”).
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Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) laws.48 UDAP laws provide state
attorneys general with authority to combat unfair or deceptive market
practices, including fraud-and-fine-print schemes.49 Moreover, both federal
and state antideception laws impose looser requirements than does the
common law doctrine of fraud: Many do not require proof that the deception
was intentional in order to prevail in court.50
The recently proposed Restatement of Consumer Contracts would offer
additional safeguards for consumers.51 The proposed Restatement would treat
any standard contract term that is inconsistent with a company’s prior
representation as presumptively deceptive, and would deem such terms
voidable—even if the consumer could not prove intentional deception or
reasonable reliance.52 According to the reporters of the draft Restatement, this
rule would incentivize businesses to “police representations made by [their]
agents and verify that they are not inconsistent with the standard contract
terms that [they] offer[].”53 While acknowledging that the parol evidence rule
generally “gives precedence to a written document when the parties intend for
that document to be the only source of their contractual obligations,” the draft
Restatement asserts that “no such intent can be inferred when an affirmation
of fact or promise is deceptively undermined by the standard contract terms
that are only weakly scrutinized by consumers.”54
Given this patchwork of legal frameworks, some have expressed optimism
that consumers are sufficiently protected from fine-print fraud.55 “Even if the
consumer would not have any cause of action based on breach of contract,
sellers are still held in check,” writes Douglas Baird, pointing to “[l]egal rules
outside of contract [law that] constrain those who are tempted to play games
with fine print.”56
48. See CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE

49.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

STATES: A 50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS 9, 33
(2018), https://perma.cc/WTH6-R46L (“All state UDAP statutes now allow consumers
to take a fraudulent business to court for at least some violations of the state UDAP
statute, and all allow the consumer to recover at least compensatory damages, such as a
refund.”).
See id. at 11; Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney General Enforcement of
Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 U. KAN. L.
REV. 209, 209-13 (2016).
See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018); CARTER, supra note 48, at 5-8, 14.
See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. 10, at 12 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft 2019).
Id. § 6 reporters’ notes.
Id.
Id. § 6 cmt. 8(c).
See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS 123 (2013).
Id.
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To legal scholars, it seems plausible that a victim of fraud is entitled to a
legal remedy, regardless of what the fine print says. Those who understand
legal norms know that sellers “cannot promise the moon during the course of
selling a product and then seek to escape legal liability by adding terms in
forms.”57 But we propose that lay consumers may have different intuitions
about how the law treats individuals who sign contracts that contradict what
they were told. Laypeople may assume that whatever the written agreement
says is enforceable and binding, and that it does not matter if one party
defrauded the other prior to signing. Even if they suspect that the term is
voidable or question its enforceability, they might be discouraged from taking
action in light of its in terrorem effect.
B. Lay Formalistic Intuitions: A Problem for Consumer Protection Efforts?
Previous work in the field of psychology documents that laypeople are
contract formalists.58 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and David Hoffman, for instance,
have shown that consumers put excessive weight on written terms (as
compared to oral agreements), believe that contracts are formed primarily
through formalities such as signature and payment (even though contract law
does not require such formalities), and feel generally obligated to abide by
terms that are imposed through formalized assent processes.59 This holds true
even when the contract terms go unread, when the contract is unreasonably
lengthy, or when the terms are perceived as one-sided or unfair.60 Laypeople
57. See id.
58. For examples of this scholarship over time, see Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain,

Research Report, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary
Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 83, 91-92 (1997) (noting that consumers are more reluctant to file meritorious
suits or otherwise seek compensation if their contracts include legally dubious
disclaimers of tort liability); Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual
Obligations Created Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5, 9, 11-15 (2011) (describing views that
laypeople feel they are bound to the signed contract due to “moral duty . . . , motivated
reasoning, and social norms”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Essay, A Psychological Account of
Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1760-61, 1764-66 (2014) (finding that people
maintained that it was fair to hold signees to fine print terms they had not read, even if
the terms were buried in a contract that they believed to be unreasonably lengthy);
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67
STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1296-97 (2015) (exploring how consumers understand contract
formation and finding that many laypersons are contract formalists); Furth-Matzkin,
On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms, supra note 24, at 41-42 (suggesting
that tenants typically assume that their lease agreements accurately represent the law);
and Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable Contract Terms, supra note 24,
at 1058 (finding that tenants feel bound by unenforceable lease provisions).
59. See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 58, at 1296-98.
60. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 58, at 1761, 1764-65.
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believe they have a duty to read the fine print, even though in most cases they
fail to do so.61
As previous commentary has noted, consumers’ lay formalism creates a
certain irony: Even though consumers regularly ignore fine print ex ante—
before making the transaction—they still regard terms buried in that fine print
as binding when they encounter them ex post—when a problem or question
arises.62 Indeed, our prior work suggests that consumers may fail to realize that
these terms are potentially voidable or already void,63 and that the presence of
fraud may do little to alter their perception that the transaction was consented
to.64
In this Article, we investigate whether consumers’ intuitive formalism
discourages them from taking action against fraudulent fine print. While
much has been written about fraud-and-fine-print cases,65 little is known
about how ordinary consumers perceive them. Do laypeople believe they are
morally or legally obligated to abide by contractual provisions that contradict
what the seller told them? Do they anticipate that courts will enforce such
provisions as written? Do they regard it as morally legitimate to enforce such
provisions as long as the consumer had a reasonable opportunity to read the

61. See id. at 1765.
62. See Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms, supra note 24,

at 6 (“[E]ven if consumers . . . do not read or pay attention to the contract terms ex ante,
they are still likely to read their contracts (or substantial portions of them) ex post,
when a problem occurs or when a question arises concerning their rights and
obligations as buyers. And at this point in time, they are likely to rely on their
contracts in determining their rights and obligations, presuming that their terms are
enforceable and binding.”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of
Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 164, 172-73 (2017) (noting that
contract terms, “afforded so little attention ex ante, have too much weight ex post ”).
63. See Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms, supra note 24
(providing survey evidence showing that residential tenants fail to contemplate the
possibility that their leases contain unenforceable terms, even though such terms are
prevalent in residential rental agreements); see also Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects
of Unenforceable Contract Terms, supra note 24, at 1066-67 (finding, based on a series of
randomized experiments, that the use of unenforceable terms harms consumers, since
such terms misinform them about their rights and remedies under the law—causing
consumers to unwittingly give up valid legal rights and claims in their post-contract
interactions with sellers).
64. Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (showing
that many laypeople perceive consent as compatible with intentional fraud).
65. See, e.g., Stark & Choplin, supra note 3, at 618-20, 624-25 (exploring how sellers enforce
fine print terms against non-contract-reading consumers that may contradict oral
assertions the seller made, and arguing against enforcement of no-reliance clauses
against unsophisticated, unrepresented consumers); see also Korobkin, supra note 3, at
63-70 (detailing how courts have adopted various unsatisfactory doctrinal strategies for
addressing the issue).
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contract, even if she neglected to do so? The following experimental studies
address these questions.
The stakes of these questions are high. Prevailing legal strategies for
combating consumer fraud have not taken account of the psychological reality
of how people respond to being cheated. The standard approaches tend to
assume that consumers who are defrauded react as lawyers do: with a sense of
grievance and a zeal to hold the wrongdoer to account.66 But if consumers are
demoralized by the fine print, they may fail to take action in response to being
defrauded. The cumulative result may be that fraud goes unpoliced in the
marketplace and society suffers a net welfare loss.
II. Study 1: Impressions of Contract Enforceability—Laypeople vs.
Experts
In this study, we asked participants to judge a fraud-and-fine-print case in
which the seller lies about a material aspect of a consumer financial product
while the contract’s written terms disclose the truth.
A. Study Design
Study 1 sought to compare how lay consumers and legal experts would
respond to a fraud-and-fine-print case involving a payment plan for an auto
loan. Building on previous findings showing that laypeople are contract
formalists,67 we hypothesized that laypeople would believe that the agreement
was enforceable as written, even though the seller had engaged in material
deception. We surmised that despite the reality that consumers almost never
read contracts attentively, laypeople would nonetheless maintain that
consumers ought to read these agreements and are responsible for whatever
they sign.
As a comparison, we also measured attitudes among a sample of legally
trained individuals: current and former law students from Harvard and Yale.68
66. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 13, at 1109 (noting that consumers faced with unfair or

fraudulent business practices may feel they are treated unfairly and therefore demand
action be taken to rectify the situation).
67. See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable Contract Terms, supra
note 24, at 1066-67; Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 58, at 1281-90, 1289 fig.4,
1297; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 58, at 1784.
68. We recognize that alumni typically have more legal experience than law students, and
that even within the alumni subsample, participants differed in their legal
backgrounds. Nonetheless, we group all those who have legal background (even to a
limited degree) together and compare them to a group that lacks any legal training. We
acknowledge that the depth of legal knowledge of contracts and consumer law varies
within our “expert sample.” In addition, we acknowledge that affiliates of these two
footnote continued on next page
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We hypothesized that legally trained individuals—in light of their acquaintance
with the law—would exhibit less formalistic attitudes than do laypeople. In
other words, we predicted that legal professionals would be more likely to
assume that consumers could void a contract that conflicts with a seller’s prior
deceptive statements, given the flaw in the contract’s formation process.
We fielded our survey with fifty-seven lay participants who were
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online subject pool.69
We excluded one participant who indicated she had attended law school. In
addition, we administered our survey to fifty-seven legally trained respondents,
whom we recruited at Harvard and Yale during their respective alumni
reunions in 2017.70 Harvard affiliates made up 86% of the sample, reflecting the
school’s larger alumni base. Lawyers accounted for 39% of the sample, while
law students accounted for 61%. We excluded two participants who were
neither students nor alumni.
In the survey, participants were asked to evaluate a scenario based on a real
fraud-and-fine-print case that was the subject of a Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) enforcement action in 2015.71 The scenario described a consumer who
law schools may differ from other legally trained individuals in background, training,
and other unobserved characteristics. See Part II.B below for a discussion.
69. See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://perma.cc/3EXG-7FQM (archived Mar. 28,
2020). Well-known psychological findings have been replicated in samples drawn
from MTurk, suggesting that crowdsourcing is a legitimate alternative to lab-based
research. See Krin Irvine et al., Law and Psychology Grows Up, Goes Online, and Replicates,
15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320, 322, 330, 344 (2018). The demographics of our sample
were as follows: 57% female; ages 19-71 years, Mage = 37.36 (mean), SDage = 12.50
(standard deviation); 77% white, 4% black/African-American, 16% Asian/AsianAmerican, 2% Hispanic/Latinx, and 2% other. Participants’ education levels ranged
from high school to professional degrees, with 87% having completed some college.
Participants were moderately left leaning (on a seven-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 being “extremely liberal” to 7 being “extremely conservative,” Mpolitical = 3.20,
SDpolitical = 1.73), with 64% identifying as slightly to extremely left of center, 16%
identifying as moderate, and 20% identifying as slightly to extremely right of center.
Approximately 38% of participants reported an annual income of less than $30,000,
approximately 20% reported making over $75,000, and the remainder reported an
income between those values. Part E of the Appendix details the extent to which
demographic characteristics predict responses.
70. Given the time constraints of surveying attendees during a reunion event, we did not
obtain demographic information for the legally trained sample.
71. See Nat’l Payment Network, Inc., 159 F.T.C. 1718, 1746-57 (2015), https://perma.cc/
6RXK-5X87. In the National Payment Network case, an auto loan company had
marketed its payment program as saving money for borrowers, while charging
significant fees that canceled out any actual savings. Id. at 1719. These fees were
disclosed in the fine print of the enrollment form consumers signed to enroll in the
payment plan. See id. at 1745 (disclosing the fees and stipulating that “in some cases the
fees charged to borrower may exceed the interest reduction”). As part of its consent
agreement with the FTC, the auto loan company issued over $1.5 million in consumer
footnote continued on next page
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was deceived by written and oral representations about the terms of an auto
loan repayment plan. The deception was material: The consumer would not
have enrolled in the plan if he had known he would incur $2.99 in fees every
time he made a biweekly payment toward the loan. The consumer failed to
read the contract and consequently did not realize that the written terms
of the agreement, which disclosed the fees, contradicted what he was told.
Participants read the following text:
William decides to buy a new car from an automobile dealership called Frank’s
Motors. On the day of his purchase, a salesperson from the dealership offers him a
five-year payment plan to finance the car.
The salesperson tells William that the program will “allow you to pay off your
loan without incurring any fees.” He shows William a flyer advertising the
program, which is called “Frank’s No Fee Financing.”
William enrolls in the program. Shortly after, he begins to notice that he is being
charged $2.99 in fees every time he makes a payment. This will add up to several
hundred dollars over the five years. He realizes that the plan actually ends up
costing more than it saves.
William contacts a Frank’s Motors representative and asks about these fees. The
representative informs him that Frank’s Motors charges a $2.99 fee every time he
makes a payment.
William checks the “Terms and Conditions” of the paperwork that he signed
when he enrolled in the program. The contract states that Frank’s Motors will
charge a $2.99 fee every time consumers make a payment.
William did not read the terms before he signed the paperwork. He would not
have enrolled in the financing program if he had known that he would incur
these fees.

After reading the scenario, participants rated their agreement with a series
of three statements, presented in random order, on a seven-point scale ranging
from 1 being “strongly disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree.” These statements
were:




A court would probably rule that William is legally required to pay the $2.99 fees.
William consented to paying the $2.99 fees.
It is fair to require William to pay the $2.99 fees.

B. Results
Our results suggest that laypeople are contract formalists. As Figure 1
illustrates, lay respondents strongly expected that a court would require the

refunds and waived nearly an additional $1 million in consumer fees. Id. at 1752. It also
agreed to refrain from misrepresenting the costs associated with its services. Id. at 1749-51.

520

Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine-Print Fraud
72 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2020)

consumer to pay the fees.72 That is, they saw the contract’s written terms as
legally binding even though the agreement was signed as a result of clear and
material deception, and they predicted that a court of law would refuse to void
the contract in such cases. Lay participants also strongly believed that the
consumer had consented to pay the $2.99 fees.73 At the same time, they felt that
it would be unfair to require him to pay the fees.74
The mismatch between respondents’ moral and legal intuitions suggests
that although laypeople perceive the law governing fraud-and-fine-print
situations as overly formalistic, they simultaneously believe that it is unfair to
impose contractual obligations on consumers in fraud-and-fine-print cases.
Thus their beliefs about what the law is and what would be fair are misaligned.

72. Mean (M) = 5.70, standard deviation (SD) = 1.73. 66% of lay participants agreed or strongly

agreed that “A court would probably rule that William is legally required to pay the
$2.99 fees.” We constructed confidence intervals using a resampling method known as
“bootstrapping.” See generally JOHN MAINDONALD & W. JOHN BRAUN, DATA ANALYSIS
AND GRAPHICS USING R: AN EXAMPLE-BASED APPROACH 131 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that
“[t]he usual approach to constructing confidence intervals is based on a statistical
theory that relies, in part, on the assumption of normally distributed observations” and
that using bootstrapping does not require such an assumption); CHRISTOPHER Z.
MOONEY & ROBERT D. DUVAL, BOOTSTRAPPING: A NONPARAMETRIC APPROACH TO
STATISTICAL INFERENCE 1 (1993) (“Bootstrapping differs from the traditional parametric
approach to inference in that it employs large numbers of repetitive computations to
estimate the shape of a statistic’s sampling distribution, rather than strong
distributional assumptions and analytic formulas.”).
73. M = 4.79, SD = 2.10. 48% of lay participants agreed or strongly agreed that “William
consented to paying the $2.99 fees.”
74. M = 3.25, SD = 2.03. Only 18% of lay participants agreed or strongly agreed that “It is fair
to require William to pay the $2.99 fees.”
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Figure 1
Perceptions of a Fraud-and-Fine-Print Case Among Lay and Legally Trained Individuals
7
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Lay and expert perceptions of whether a contract induced by fraud was legally
binding, consented to, and fair to enforce against the deceived party. Lay respondents
regarded the fine print as more legally enforceable and consented-to than did
legally trained participants. The groups did not differ in their judgments of how
fair it would be to enforce the fine print against the defrauded consumer. Error
bars represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Next, we examined how lay participants’ intuitions compared to those of
legally trained individuals. Overall, as expected, legally trained respondents
expressed less formalistic attitudes than did lay respondents; they were more
likely to believe that a court would invalidate the contract.75 They also were
more inclined to view the consumer’s consent as suspect.76 At the same time,
there was no significant difference between lawyers and laypeople in their
75. M = 4.35, SD = 1.92. Only 37% agreed or strongly agreed that a court would require

William to pay the fees. This was significantly different from the lay sample,
t (111) = 3.92, p < 0.001. For an overview of the independent samples t -test, see GUSTAV
LEVINE, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR PSYCHOLOGY: THE LOGIC AND THE METHODS
212-18 (1981). One might wonder why the percentage among the legally trained sample
was above 0%. While the survey cannot answer this question definitively, we can note
that the lawyers and law students were not necessarily specialists in consumer law.
More importantly, even consumer law experts seem to disagree about what a court
might do: Some think it would be shocking for a court to enforce a contractual term
induced by fraud, while others think enforcement is a plausible legal outcome. We
thank the participants of the Consumer Law Scholars Conference for their helpful
feedback on this point.
76. M = 3.51, SD = 2.10. Only 21% agreed or strongly agreed that William had consented.
This was significantly different from the lay sample, t (111) = 3.24, p = 0.002.
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judgments of fairness.77 The legally trained participants, like the lay subjects,
felt that it would be unfair to require the consumer to pay the fees.78
In sum, laypeople strongly expected that the consumer would be held to
the contract that he or she had signed, even though the consumer had been
deceived about a material aspect of the transaction. This finding suggests that
laypeople’s intuitive formalism extends to their legal predictions even in cases
involving outright fraud. Additionally, laypeople evidently believe that
contract law, as they perceive it, is excessively harsh in fraud-and-fine-print
situations.
By contrast, individuals with legal training did not show the same degree
of formalism. They appeared more doubtful that the contract would be
enforced by a court of law, and they generally perceived the signer’s consent
to the hidden fee to be compromised. Interestingly, laypeople and legal
professionals did not differ in their moral judgments about whether it would
be fair to hold William to the fee. This suggests that lawyers’ experience alters
their legal intuitions without significantly affecting their moral judgments.
To be sure, the participants who enroll in studies on MTurk and the
current and former law students from Harvard and Yale may differ in many
ways other than their level of legal training. Nonetheless, comparing these two
populations is instructive because it reveals how those in the legal elite—who
disproportionately become judges and legislators—may hold intuitions about
contract law that differ from those held by the larger population. Our claim is
not that legal training is the sole cause of the observed differences between the
MTurk and the lawyer samples; it is that laypeople’s intuitions are more
formalistic than legal professionals’ intuitions. This is important because the
individuals who are responsible for making and interpreting consumer
protection laws, including laws governing fraud-and-fine-print situations, are
likely to share the intuitions of the legal elites, not those of the lay population.
Consequently, these powerful actors might fail to appreciate how regular
consumers are likely to react to being deceived in fraud-and-fine-print cases.
This mismatch is reflected in the legal literature on consumer contracts.
Scholars tend to treat fine print as if it does not matter; they assume that it has
no effect on consumers, because consumers rarely read their contracts.79 Yet
our results suggest that the fine print can have a perverse effect: When laypeople
do read the terms after something goes wrong, they feel bound by the contract
they signed.80 This holds true even when they were lied to before signing.
77. t (110) = 1.21, p = 0.23.
78. M = 2.79, SD = 2.04. Only 16% agreed or strongly agreed that it would be fair to require

William to pay the fees.
79. See sources cited supra note 1.
80. This finding is in line with prior research. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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III. Study 2: The Effect of Fine Print on Consumers’ Willingness to
Complain
In Study 2, we examined the effect of fraudulent fine print on laypeople’s
responses to deception. Participants judged a fraud-and-fine-print scenario
similar to the one presented in Study 1: A consumer is specifically informed
that there would be no fees associated with an auto loan payment plan, yet is
charged $2.99 biweekly fees. The consumer later realizes that these fees are laid
out in the fine print of a contract he signed without reading.
We hypothesized that even though consumers regularly ignore the terms
of contracts ex ante, they would believe that these terms were binding when
they encountered them ex post. Consequently, they would see little point in
taking action against the deceptive company. We took no position on whether
it would be rational for consumers to pursue litigation to redress a $2.99 hidden
fee, even if the sum amounted to several hundred dollars over the course of the
five-year repayment period. Rather, we were interested in learning whether
participants’ sense of grievance—their self-reported intention to take action,
legal or otherwise—was altered by the presence or absence of a hidden term.
A. Study Design
In Study 2, we asked 100 lay participants81 to judge the auto loan scenario
presented in Study 1, with a key difference: This time, participants were asked
an open-ended question about what they would do if they were in the
consumer’s position. Participants wrote down what they imagined they would
do if they had signed up for the auto loan described in the scenario.
We surmised that participants in the standard “Fraud & Fine Print”
condition would be reluctant to take action against the deceptive company
because of the chilling effect generated by the fine print. Consequently, we
hypothesized that few participants in the Fraud & Fine Print condition would
spontaneously express an interest in suing the auto loan company. We also
predicted that few participants would feel motivated to complain within
the company, or to report the fraud to the Better Business Bureau or other
81. As in Study 1, participants were recruited from MTurk. The demographics of this

sample were as follows: 43% female; ages 20-69 years, Mage = 35.37, SDage = 11.32; 72%
white, 12% black/African-American, 10% Asian/Asian-American, 4% Hispanic/Latinx,
and 2% other. Participants’ education levels ranged from high school to professional
degrees, with 81% having completed some college. Participants were moderately left
leaning (on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 being “extremely liberal” to 7
being “extremely conservative,” Mpolitical = 3.55, SDpolitical = 1.74), with 48% identifying as
slightly to extremely left of center, 23% identifying as moderate, and 29% identifying as
slightly to extremely right of center. Approximately 33% of participants reported an
annual income of less than $30,000, approximately 20% reported making over $75,000,
and the remainder reported an income between those values.
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consumer protection groups. Similarly, we predicted that few participants
would describe other means of complaining, such as posting a negative review
on social media, giving the dealership a low rating on crowdsourced review
sites such as Yelp, or telling their friends. This was because we thought that
consumers would feel that they were to blame for their misfortune. After all,
they assumed the risk of encountering an unpleasant surprise when they
neglected to read the fine print.
To provide a comparison, we tested a separate version of the scenario, in
which the auto loan company equally lied about the terms of the loan. The key
difference between the two versions of the scenario is that in the new
version—the “Fraud Only” condition—the contract that the consumer signed
contained no disclosure of the fees. That is, the company charged the consumer
fees, even though the seller had stated that there would be no fees and the
written terms of the contract did not authorize the company to impose any fees.
Here, we hypothesized, participants would feel highly aggrieved. They
would report strong intentions to pursue recourse: sue the company, file a
complaint, post a bad review online, or take some other form of action. Even
though the firm was equally deceptive, and the consumer did not read the
contract in either case, the fact that the consumer had an opportunity to read it
in the Fraud & Fine Print version (and no opportunity to read it in the Fraud
Only version) would make a difference to participants’ intuitive reactions to
the situation. In short, we tested the hypothesis that a fine-print term that goes
unread is worse than no term at all, because the fine print deters consumers
from seeking recourse when they are deceived.
Study 2 thus had two conditions: (1) Fraud & Fine Print and (2) Fraud Only.
The full text of each condition and the full slate of dependent measures are
reported in the Appendix. Here, we focused on how participants responded to
the open-ended question asking what they would do if they faced the
consumer’s situation. A trio of independent coders—unaware of the study’s
purpose, hypothesis, and manipulation—coded participants’ written responses.82
We were primarily interested in whether participants were inclined to just
pay the surprise fee and move on, or whether they would express intention to
pursue some kind of recourse—such as hiring a lawyer, complaining within the
company, or posting a negative review online. Our question was whether the
presence of the fine print would deter participants not only from considering
legal recourse, but also from telling others what happened. This question is
important, because if laypeople are discouraged from complaining or alerting

82. Whenever the three coders were not in unanimous agreement about the proper binary

code to assign to a response, we dropped the minority vote and used the coding given
by the two-person majority.
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others, companies can use fine print to get away with deceptive business
practices without risking their reputations.
B. Results
The presence of the fine-print term made a substantial difference to
participants’ self-reported intentions, as shown in Table 1. Most people in the
Fraud & Fine Print condition (73%) indicated that they would “lump it”—just
pay the fee. Few described wanting to take any kind of action, including legal
action, complaining to someone within the company, or trying to influence
other customers by tarnishing the company’s reputation.83 In the Fraud Only
condition, by contrast, a large majority of participants (81%) wanted to take
some kind of action. Over half of the participants (57%) contemplated taking
legal action. Relatively few (15%) were inclined to accept the situation and
move on.

83. Furthermore, it is possible (perhaps even likely) that some participants overestimated,

and consequently overstated, their propensity to take action such as complaining to
the company’s manager or writing a bad review online; indeed, in practice, many
customers may not follow through on pursuing recourse against a deceptive seller.
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Table 1
Study 2 Participants’ Responses to the Question:
“If you were [the consumer], what would you do in this situation?”

Category

Resignation

Seek Recourse
Through Law

Seek Recourse
Through
Nonlegal
Actions

Examples of Responses

Fraud &
Fine Print
Condition
(n = 52)

Fraud
Only
Condition
(n = 48)




I would just pay.
I would acknowledge that I was
tricked and carry on with the 5
year contract.

73%

15%




I would talk to a lawyer.
I would sue them.

10%

57%



I would ask to talk to the
manager of the company and
complain.
I would contact their customer
service or the HR department to
complain about how their
employee cheated me.
I would cancel and pay the
termination fee. Then I’d leave
bad reviews on the company to
prevent others from being
ripped off.
I would pay the early termination
fee, so the dealership gets the least
amount of my money. I would
spam social media accounts about
the dishonesty of the dealership
and salesperson.

12%

32%

10%

13%

4%

4%





Tarnish the
Company’s
Reputation



Other or
No Response



I am unsure.

To be sure, participants’ self-reported responses to a hypothetical scenario
may be inaccurate predictions of their actual behavior. Nonetheless, this
experimental design allowed us to observe how the presence of fine print
affects consumers’ feelings of grievance in response to fraud. Because many
more participants indicated intentions to sue in one condition versus the other,
we can see that fine print had a demoralizing effect on their willingness to take
action in response to fraud.
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As described earlier, deceptive business practices interfere with the proper
functioning of markets because they induce consumers to enter into
transactions that make them worse off. For markets to function efficiently,
unscrupulous firms must be punished for their deception. There are many
ways this could happen: State attorneys general or the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) could bring enforcement actions,84 customers could
bring private suits,85 word could get out that the company cheats people and
the company could lose business as a result, and so on. Study 2’s findings
suggest, however, that defrauded consumers are disinclined to sue or complain,
as long as their contract contains a term that contradicts, disclaims, or qualifies
what they were told. Unscrupulous businesses may therefore be able to lie to
consumers while securing consumers’ silence by hiding the company’s true
policies in the unread fine print.
One might wonder whether, even if consumers are deterred from
pursuing legal action, they might nonetheless warn their friends about the
hazards of conducting business with the deceptive company. Yet participants’
responses reveal that those who express no intention to sue the deceptive
company are also reluctant to take extralegal action: They indicate little
intention to complain or tell others what happened. This, in turn, raises
substantial doubts as to whether the reputation mechanism can effectively
discipline sellers from misbehaving. If consumers blame themselves for failing
to catch fine-print fraud, they may feel resigned to the unfair outcome instead
of feeling outraged and aggrieved at the deception.
84. See, e.g., Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and Private

Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 920, 927
(2017) (noting that the FTC and CFPB continue to partner with state attorneys general
on “enforcement ‘sweeps’” and that the CFPB and state attorneys general both
actively enforce consumer protection laws); Chris D’Angelo, How We Keep You Safe
in the Consumer Financial Marketplace, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU: BLOG
(June 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/9U3E-ZQVR (describing enforcement actions against
fraudulent companies and explaining that Congress “gave the Bureau the ability to
hold companies accountable for committing unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or
practices,” authority that helps the CFPB “ensure that bad actors cannot use deceit and
fraud”). See generally Prentiss Cox et al., Strategies of Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 37, 57-59 (2018) (discussing public UDAP enforcement strategies and methods).
85. See Michael Flynn, This Is the End . . . My Friend: Disgorgement, Dissolution and Sequestration
as Remedies Under State UDAP Statutes, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 181, 183 (2008) (noting
that most state UDAP statutes provide for a private right of action); Jeff Sovern, Private
Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model,
52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 437 (1991) (“[M]ost states—in an effort further to discourage
inappropriate trade practices and to compensate injured consumers—have extended to
private consumers the right to sue for deceptive and, in some states, unfair trade
practices.”). See generally CARTER, supra note 48 (examining state UDAP laws and
private rights of action); Silverman & Wilson, supra note 49 (exploring consumers’
private rights of action as well as enforcement by state attorneys general of consumer
fraud and deception laws).

528

Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine-Print Fraud
72 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2020)

IV. Study 3: Fraud vs. Fine Print
Study 1 showed that laypeople generally assume they will not be able to
void a contractual term even if it conflicts with a seller’s prior, deceptive
representation. Study 2 showed that inserting conflicting information into a
contract has a demoralizing effect on consumers’ reactions to being deceived:
Consumers express less interest in pursuing recourse, and more willingness to
just take their lumps, when they are tricked into signing a contract containing
a conflicting term.
Study 3 aimed to explore laypeople’s formalistic attitudes further by
experimentally manipulating key features of the scenario. Our first question
pertained to the role of the contradictory fine print in fraud-and-fine-print
situations. Specifically, we wondered: If the contract was silent about certain
fees, would laypeople conclude that the consumer did not have to pay them? Or
would they believe that as long as the company’s policy was to impose these
fees, the consumer was obliged to pay them notwithstanding the fact that the
written agreement was silent? Our second question was how much difference
deception in the formation process makes. If the seller falsely promised the
consumer that no fees would be incurred, would laypeople feel that the
consumer was less obligated to pay them—compared to a situation where the
seller did not make any representation about the fees, and the consumer
merely presumed that no fees would be charged despite the fine-print disclosure
of the fees?
Our hypothesis was that both features would matter, but we sought to
discover which feature—the presence of fraud, or the presence of a fine-print
term disclosing the fees—would affect lay intuitions more. If laypeople are
extreme contract formalists, we would expect them to care much less about
what was said and understood at the time of formation, and much more about
the written terms of the finalized document. Consequently, they would feel
bound to the contract terms, whether the seller misinformed them about these
terms prior to signing or not.
A. Study Design
We recruited 151 participants86 and randomly assigned them to one of
three conditions: (1) Fine Print Only, (2) Fraud & Fine Print, or (3) Fraud Only.
86. As in Studies 1 and 2, the sample was recruited from MTurk. The demographics of the

sample were as follows: 41% female; ages 18-68 years, Mage = 32.74, SD = 9.53; 64% white,
18% black/African-American, 11% Asian/Asian-American, and 7% Hispanic/Latinx.
Participants’ education levels ranged from high school to doctoral degrees, with 83%
having completed some college. Participants were left leaning overall (on a seven-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 being “extremely liberal” to 7 being “extremely
conservative,” M = 3.07, SD = 1.68), with 60% identifying as slightly to extremely left of
footnote continued on next page
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Each participant read three scenarios presented in random order—an auto loan
scenario,87 a telecommunications scenario,88 and a mortgage scenario89—that
aligned with their condition. The reason for administering multiple scenarios
was to examine whether attitudes toward fine-print fraud would generalize
beyond the $2.99 auto loan fees. We wondered, for instance, whether
participants would feel the same about a surprise term that led to a $12,000
penalty.
All scenarios described a consumer who entered into a contract without
reading the terms and was later surprised by a fee. In all conditions, the
consumers would not have chosen to enter the transaction had they known
about the fee.
To illustrate, here we provide the three versions of the telecommunications
scenario, in which a consumer was charged a fee for exceeding a phone plan’s
allotted minutes. The full text of all three scenarios and all three conditions is
reproduced in the Appendix.

center, 21% identifying as moderate, and 20% identifying as slightly to extremely right
of center. Approximately 30% reported an annual income of less than $30,000, 15%
reported making over $75,000, and the remaining 54% reported making between those
values.
87. The auto loan scenario is based on the same 2015 FTC enforcement action on which
Study 1 was modeled. See supra note 71.
88. The telecommunications scenario is based on Chapman v. Skype Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d
864 (Ct. App. 2013). In that case, Skype advertised its calling plan as “[u]nlimited” but
stipulated in the fine print that calls were, in fact, limited to a certain number of
minutes due to a “fair usage policy.” Id. at 869. The California Court of Appeal sided
with the consumer (reversing the trial court), finding that she had adequately alleged
fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 875-76, 878. We altered the facts of Chapman
slightly to make the case more egregious, by reducing the number of minutes allowed
under the plan from 10,000 to 1,000 minutes.
89. The mortgage scenario is based on Davis v. G.N. Mortgage Corp., 396 F.3d 869 (7th Cir.
2005). In that case, a loan officer portrayed a mortgage as having a two-year
prepayment penalty, when under the contract it was a five-year prepayment penalty.
Id. at 873-75. The court decided against the borrowers, holding that they had a duty to
read the mortgage agreement and therefore could not have reasonably relied on the
(false) representations of the loan officer. Id. at 882-83. It explained that the consumers
“had an opportunity and obvious obligation to read the documents before they signed
them” and that “they were not justified in relying on the alleged verbal statements
alone.” Id. at 882.
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Fine Print Only
(No Seller Fraud)

Fraud & Fine Print

Fraud Only
(No Fine Print)

Melissa purchases an international calling plan from ACME,
a telecommunications company.
The plan is advertised as “Unlimited World,” and is
described in promotional ads as “allowing unlimited
phone calls to multiple destinations.”

—

The plan comes with a
“Fair Usage Policy,” which
states: “The plan is limited
to 1,000 minutes per
month. Calls in excess of
this limit will incur the
normal rates and
connection fees.”

In fact, the plan comes
with a “Fair Usage Policy,”
which states: “The plan is
limited to 1,000 minutes
per month. Calls in excess
of this limit will incur the
normal rates and
connection fees.”

In fact, the plan is limited
to 1,000 minutes per
month. Calls in excess of
this limit incur the
normal rates and
connection fees.

Melissa would not have bought the plan if she had known that it was
limited to 1,000 minutes per month. A few months after purchasing the
plan, she notices that her credit card was charged “overage fees” for
exceeding her monthly limit. She contacts ACME and asks a
representative about the fees on her credit card statement.
The representative informs her that the “Unlimited World” plan
is limited to 1,000 minutes per month.

He refers her to ACME’s “Fair Usage Policy,”
which she clicked through months ago when she
completed the purchase, without reading.

Melissa finds ACME’s
“Fair Usage Policy,” which
she clicked through
months ago when she
completed the purchase,
without reading.

—

The Fair Use Policy says
nothing about how many
minutes customers can
use per month.
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After each scenario, participants rated, in randomized order, the degree to
which:






A court would probably rule that the consumer is legally required to pay the fee.
The consumer consented to pay the fee.
It is fair to require the consumer to pay the fee.
The consumer had fair notice about the fee.
The consumer was reasonable in assuming he or she would not have to pay
the fee.

These items create a coherent scale.90 Therefore, we averaged them together
to create a composite measure of overall beliefs on whether the consumer is
bound to pay the fee.91
To confirm that participants had understood the key aspects of the scenario,
we asked them, upon completion of the study, whether “[t]he agreement that
the consumer signed with the seller stated that there would be a fee.” We
conducted the statistical analyses with and without the participants who
failed this manipulation check (n = 11), and the findings were not significantly
different. Here we report the findings with these participants excluded. We also
excluded four participants who self-reported any background or training in law.
B. Results
As before, the findings show that laypeople are contract formalists. On the
composite measure that combines the five items, participants reported that the
consumer was significantly less bound to comply with the company’s policy in
the Fraud Only condition than in the other two conditions. This pattern held
true in all three scenarios, as Figure 2 illustrates.
Moreover, in all three scenarios, there was no significant difference
between participants’ beliefs in the Fraud & Fine Print condition and the Fine
Print Only condition. Participants felt that the consumer was similarly bound
to the written terms, whether there was a prior misrepresentation or not.92
90. α = 0.93. We use Cronbach’s alpha to measure the association among the five questions.

See generally TIMOTHY C. URDAN, STATISTICS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 222 (4th ed. 2017)
(“Cronbach’s alpha . . . uses the associations among a set of items to indicate how well
the items, as a group, hold together. Conceptually, the idea is that all of the survey
items that are supposed to measure a single underlying construct should be answered
in a similar way by respondents.”).
91. For the purpose of this averaging, we inverted the scoring on the reasonableness item,
so that higher numbers on the scale indicate greater belief that the consumer was not
reasonable in relying on the assumption that he or she would incur no fee.
92. In order to control for the effect of the order of the scenarios that participants read on
their responses’ in each scenario, we simulated a between-subjects design by comparing
participants’ responses to just the scenario they saw first. For the telecommunications
scenario, the Fine Print Only condition (M = 4.83, SD = 1.56) did not differ from the Fraud
footnote continued on next page
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Importantly, this pattern was observed regardless of whether the
fraudulent representation was oral or written, suggesting that evidentiary
concerns—that is, whether the representation would be provable in court if the
seller denied it—cannot fully explain the effect of the conflicting fine print.
Figure 2
Perceptions That Consumer Is Bound to Pay the Fees, by Scenario
7
6
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Telecommunications
Scenario
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Fine Print Only

Auto Loan
Scenario
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Fraud & Fine Print

Mortgage
Scenario

D

Fraud Only

Perceptions of three kinds of consumer contracts—a phone plan, a car loan, and a
mortgage—when the consumer was not deceived about the terms (Fine Print
Only), was deceived about a condition that was stated in the fine print (Fraud &
Fine Print), or was deceived about a condition that was not stated in the fine print
(Fraud Only). Across all three kinds of contracts, participants perceived the Fraud
Only scenario to be less binding than either the Fine Print Only or the Fraud &
Fine Print scenarios, suggesting that the lack of written terms makes a large
difference to consumer attitudes. Judgments of the two fine-print scenarios did
not differ significantly, despite the presence of seller deception in Fraud & Fine
Print and the absence of seller deception in Fine Print Only. Error bars represent
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.

& Fine Print condition (M = 4.88, SD = 1.46), t (48) = 0.11, pHolm-adjusted = 0.91. Each differed
from the Fraud Only condition (M = 2.14, SD = 1.64), pHolm-adjusted < 0.001. Similarly, for the
auto loan scenario, the Fine Print Only condition (M = 4.30, SD = 1.43) did not differ from
the Fraud & Fine Print condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.72), t (39) = 0.49, pHolm-adjusted = 0.63.
Each differed from the Fraud Only condition (M = 2.05, SD = 0.98), pHolm-adjusted < 0.002. For
the mortgage scenario, the same pattern was obtained: The Fine Print Only condition
(M = 4.76, SD = 1.60) did not differ from the Fraud & Fine Print condition (M = 4.58,
SD = 1.09), t (40) = 0.34, pHolm-adjusted = 0.73. Each differed from the Fraud Only condition
(M = 3.00, SD = 1.26), pHolm-adjusted < 0.007. For an overview of the Holm procedure for
adjusting p-values to account for multiple comparisons, see MULTIPLE TESTING PROBLEMS
IN PHARMACEUTICAL STATISTICS 67-70 (Alex Dmitrienko et al. eds., 2009).

533

Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine-Print Fraud
72 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2020)

These findings suggest that it does not much matter to participants
whether the seller deceived the consumer: As long as the fee-imposing term is
contained in the written contract, participants expect the consumer to be held
to it. Relatedly, when the contract is silent on the matter, as in the Fraud Only
condition, participants believe that the consumer is not and should not be
obliged to pay the fee.
We also examined each of the five individual measures separately:
judgments of legal status, consent, notice, fairness, and the reasonableness of
the consumer’s assumption that there would be no fees. Figure 3 shows how
judgments of the five items differed by condition (combined across subject
matter scenarios).
Figure 3
Legal Status, Consent, Notice, Fairness, and Reasonableness
Combined Across Subject Matter Scenarios
7
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Perceptions of the legal status of a fee—as well as whether the consumer
consented, had fair notice, could be fairly required to pay, and was reasonable in
believing no fee would be charged—when the consumer was not deceived about
the fee (Fine Print Only); was deceived about the fee, which was provided for in
the fine print (Fraud & Fine Print); or was deceived about the fee, which was not
provided for in the fine print (Fraud Only). Because no significant differences
were observed based on the kind of contract at issue (phone plan, auto loan, or
mortgage), the three kinds of contracts are averaged together here. Error bars
represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
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As Figure 3 illustrates, participants drew no significant distinction between
Fine Print Only and Fraud & Fine Print when it came to any of these five
individual measures.93 This indicates, again, that laypeople perceive the fine
print as binding regardless of whether the seller misrepresented the terms. On
the other hand, participants’ reactions to the Fraud Only condition were starkly
different.94 When the written contract did not mention the fee, people more
strongly believe that the consumer does not, and should not, have to pay the fee.
We also asked participants: “If you were [the consumer], what would you
do in this situation?” As before, three independent coders, unaware of the
study’s hypotheses and manipulation, coded participants’ responses. The
purpose of this analysis was to learn whether participants were inclined to
take some kind of action, such as complaining or pursuing legal recourse, or
whether they felt resigned to just “lumping it.”
As Table 2 shows, most participants in the Fraud Only condition expressed
interest in taking some kind of action to dispute the fee, including legal action.
By contrast, few participants in the Fraud & Fine Print and Fine Print Only
conditions expressed interest in taking action; most were resigned to just
paying the fee and moving on. These findings are consistent with the
quantitative data from the previous studies, showing that laypeople view the
consumer as bound by the fine print in fraud-and-fine-print cases. They are
also consistent with the qualitative results of Study 2, showing that few people
express interest in taking action in these situations.

93. Legal judgments: t (94) = 1.08, p = 0.28; consent judgments: t (94) = 0.006, p = 0.99; notice

judgments: t (94) = 0.13, p = 0.89; fairness judgments: t (94) = 0.23, p = 0.82; reasonableness
judgments: t (94) = 1.03, p = 0.31.
94. All p < 0.005.
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Table 2
Study 3: How Participants Would Respond to Unanticipated Fees
Condition and Scenario
Fine Print Only (n = 47)
Auto Loan Scenario
Telecommunications Scenario
Mortgage Scenario
Fraud Only (n = 40)
Auto Loan Scenario
Telecommunications Scenario
Mortgage Scenario
Fraud & Fine Print (n = 49)
Auto Loan Scenario
Telecommunications Scenario
Mortgage Scenario

Take Some
Kind of
Action

Take Legal
Action

Pay and
Move On

36%
24%
26%

13%
2%
11%

47%
60%
48%

78%
75%
82%

50%
32%
70%

12%
18%
20%

39%
27%
51%

6%
8%
31%

41%
59%
43%

The comparison between participants’ reactions in the Fraud Only condition
and in the Fraud & Fine Print condition shows the power of the fine print. It
seems that written terms—even terms that directly contradict the seller’s
assurances—deter consumers from pursuing grievances by taking action (using
the law or otherwise) against the deceptive seller.
V. Study 4: How Knowledge About the Law Affects Attitudes
Study 3 showed that consumer attitudes track the contract’s written terms
and appear to take little to no account of the seller’s fraud in the presence of
contradictory fine print. This finding suggests that laypeople are contract
formalists: They seem to focus mainly on the terms contained within the four
corners of the document and to overlook important flaws in the process of
formation.
In Study 4, we examined the role that participants’ beliefs about the law
play in determining their attitudes toward fine-print fraud. We hypothesized
that participants’ demoralized reactions to fine-print fraud were driven, at
least in part, by their perception that such terms are legally binding. We
suspected if that we could alter participants’ beliefs about the legal status of
such terms, we would see a shift in their responses—including an increase in
their self-reported willingness to take action to challenge fine-print fraud.
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A. Study Design
We recruited 300 respondents from Prolific, an online participant pool.95
All participants read the auto loan scenario from the previous studies, in
which an auto dealer falsely told a consumer named William that a payment
plan would save him money over time and that he would incur no fees, even
though the dealership actually charges fees each time the account is debited
and the plan ends up costing the consumer more than it saves. This time,
participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions:
(1) Information, (2) Fraud & Fine Print, or (3) Fraud Only.
In the Information condition, the scenario was identical to the Fraud &
Fine Print condition, with one key difference: After participants read the facts
of William’s case (including the fact that the contract he signed discloses the
fees), they were provided with information about the law in William’s state.
Participants in this condition read the following:
Now we’d like to tell you about the consumer protection laws in the state where
William lives. In William’s state, a person may be able to get out of a contract if a
court finds that the person relied on a deceptive statement made by the seller
before the consumer signed the contract. This could happen even if the seller’s
deceptive statement is contradicted by what is written in the contract.

The purpose of including this manipulation was to ascertain whether
learning that William may be able to get out of his contract would affect
participants’ judgments and self-reported intentions to seek recourse. This
might happen, for instance, if participants were otherwise inclined to assume
that William had no chance of getting out of his contract.

95. In order to rule out the possibility that the results from Studies 1-3 are specific to the

MTurk subject pool, we obtained our sample from Prolific (formerly Prolific
Academic), a participant recruitment platform for researchers. See PROLIFIC,
https://perma.cc/793H-YTT7 (archived Feb. 2, 2020). Participants recruited through
Prolific tend to be more diverse along certain demographic dimensions than
those recruited from MTurk. Eyal Peer et al., Beyond the Turk: Alternative Platforms
for Crowdsourcing Behavioral Research, 70 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 153, 159
(2017). Previous research has shown that Prolific produces higher quality data in
some respects: Participants are more honest and less experienced with taking surveys.
See id. at 157. The demographics of this sample are as follows: 44% female; ages 18-54
years, Mage = 24.46, SD = 5.25; 69% white, 5% black/African-American, 19% Asian/AsianAmerican, 5% Hispanic/Latinx, and 1% other. The sample was restricted to adult U.S.
citizens currently living in the United States. Participants’ education levels ranged
from grammar school to doctoral degrees, with 82% having completed some college.
Participants were quite left leaning overall (on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from
1 being “extremely liberal” to 7 being “extremely conservative,” M = 2.97, SD = 1.55),
with 65% identifying as slightly to extremely left of center, 18% identifying as
moderate, and 17% identifying as slightly to extremely right of center. Approximately
31% reported an annual income of less than $30,000, 29% reported making over $75,000,
and the remaining 40% reported making between between those values.
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After reading the scenario, participants indicated what they would do if
they were in William’s shoes. Next, they rated how likely they would be to
take the matter to court (on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 being
“extremely unlikely” to 7 being “extremely likely”). Subsequently, participants
reported their legal, consent, and fairness judgments as before. They also
completed a demographic questionnaire and manipulation checks.96 Participants
who failed the manipulation checks were excluded from the analysis (findings
with these participants included are reported in the Appendix).97
B. Results
Providing information about the legal status of fine-print fraud made a
significant difference to participants’ judgments. First, participants in the
Information condition were more likely to expect that the consumer would
prevail in court. As Figure 4 shows, those in the Information condition were
significantly less likely than those in the standard Fraud & Fine Print condition
to believe that the court would require the consumer to pay the fees. This
suggests that the information provided to participants altered their
perceptions of the legal status of fine-print fraud.
Second, providing information about the law also affected participants’
self-reported intentions to sue, their perceptions of whether the consumer had
consented to the fees, and even their judgments of whether it would be fair
to require the consumer to pay the fees.98 Thus, participants’ factual beliefs
96. One such check asked whether the contract William signed stated that consumer

would be charged per-debit fees of $2.99 (“Yes”/“No”). The second manipulation check
asked whether, according to the laws in William’s state, “a person might be able to get
out of a contract if they relied on a deceptive statement made by the seller before they
signed the contract, even though the written contract terms contradict the seller’s
statement” (“Probably true”/“Probably false”). Our manipulation check shows that the
legal instruction in the Information condition succeeded in altering participants’ legal
predictions: A vast majority of participants (98%) in this condition believed that a
consumer in William’s state may be able to void a contract which conflicts with a
seller’s prior deceptive statement, compared to only 62% of participants in the Fraud &
Fine Print condition. A chi-square test reveals that this difference is statistically
significant, χ2(1) = 39.51, p < 0.001, ϕ = 0.47, indicating that the manipulation succeeded
in altering participants’ background beliefs about the law. For an overview of the chisquare test of independence, see LEVINE, supra note 75, at 374-95.
97. Here, we report the findings excluding (1) participants who incorrectly stated that
the written contract disclosed the fees, when the scenario specified that it did not;
(2) participants who incorrectly stated that the written contract did not disclose the
fees, when the scenario specified that it did; and (3) the 2% of participants in the
Information condition who did not believe that the law might allow William to
rescind the contract, when the scenario specified that it might.
98. Intentions to sue: t (171) = 4.26, p < 0.001; legal predictions: t (171) = 8.03, p < 0.001; consent
judgments: t (171) = 2.14, p = 0.034; fairness judgments: tWelch(145.95) = 3.18, p = 0.002. We
use Welch’s two-sample t-test for fairness judgments because an F-test comparing the
footnote continued on next page
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about the legal status of fine-print fraud seem to play an important role in
shaping their judgments.
Figure 4
Information vs. Fraud & Fine Print vs. Fraud Only
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How information about consumer rights affects perceptions of a fraudulently
induced contract. When told that the law may provide for remedy in cases of
fraud (Information), respondents were more likely to express an intention to sue,
more optimistic that a court would invalidate the fraudulently induced term, and
less inclined to say the consumer consented or that it would be fair to require the
consumer to pay the fee; as compared to when respondents are given no
information about the law (Fraud & Fine Print). Yet when it came to judgments of
consent and fairness, the informational intervention did not completely
counteract the presence of the fine print, as compared to a case in which no fine
print existed at all (Fraud Only). Error bars represent bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals.

We can also compare the Information condition to the Fraud Only condition
to determine whether information about the law counteracts the psychological
effect of the conflicting fine print, such that participants—after receiving
information about the law—respond as if there were no fine print in the first place.
two variances showed that they were not equal. A standard t-test assumes that the
variances in the two samples are roughly equal (which is here measured by an F-test).
Welch’s test, which makes fewer assumptions, is more appropriate when equal
variances cannot be assumed. See, e.g., Jessica R. Hoag & Chia-Ling Kuo, Normal and
Non-Normal Data Simulations for the Evaluation of Two-Sample Location Tests, in MONTECARLO SIMULATION-BASED STATISTICAL MODELING 41, 42 (Ding-Geng (Din) Chen &
John Dean Chen eds., 2017).
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For the first item—intention to sue—the results revealed no significant
difference between the Information condition and the Fraud Only condition.99
This suggests that the informational intervention succeeded in counteracting
the effect of the fine print. In other words, those who were told that the law
might provide for a remedy expressed no less inclination to sue than did those
who were told that the contract had never provided for the hidden fees in the
first place.
At the same time, the informational intervention did not completely
counteract the effect of the fine print for the other three items—expectations
of the legal outcome,100 perceptions of consent,101 and fairness.102 That is,
participants in the Fraud Only condition were still more likely than those in
the Information condition to believe that a court would require William to pay
the hidden fee. Similarly, they were still less inclined to think that William had
consented to the fee, and that it would be legitimate to require him to pay the
fee, when the contract was silent than when it provided for the fee and they
were told that the law might provide for remedy. Thus, providing legal
information appears to change attitudes and reported intentions, but does not
completely counteract the effects generated by the presence of the fine print.
Finally, Study 4 participants were asked, “If you were William, what would
you do in this situation?” Participants wrote their answers before they had the
opportunity to see the survey questions or the manipulation checks. Table 3
reports how frequently participants in the different conditions mentioned
taking action in general, taking legal action specifically, or expressing
resignation. As before, participants’ responses were coded by independent
research assistants who were unaware of the study’s conditions, hypotheses,
and objectives.

99. tWelch(169.27) = 1.67, p = 0.096. Note, however, that the observed difference is statistically

significant at the α = 0.10 level. This means that under a less stringent test, we would
conclude that participants were more interested in suing in the Fraud Only than in the
Information condition, suggesting that the informational intervention did not
completely counteract the presence of the fine print as compared to a case where no
fine print existed at all.
100. t (184) = 2.03, p = 0.044.
101. tWelch(173.77) = 6.85, p < 0.001.
102. tWelch(168.25) = 3.17, p < 0.002.
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Table 3
Study 4: How Participants Would Respond to Unanticipated Fees
Condition

n

Information
Fraud & Fine Print
Fraud Only

94
79
92

Take Some
Kind of
Action
74%
41%
82%

Take Legal
Action

Pay and
Move On

56%
15%
48%

29%
71%
28%

As Table 3 shows, most participants in the standard Fraud & Fine Print
condition expressed resignation and little intention to take action—through
the legal system or otherwise. As before, participants in the Fraud Only
condition expressed greater interest in taking action, including legal action.
Crucially, those in the Information condition also showed greater inclination
to take action, suggesting that beliefs about the law contribute to
feelings of grievance. Participants’ written responses are consistent with their
quantitative answers: Both manipulations—removing the fee-imposing term
from the contract (as in the Fraud Only condition) and educating consumers
about consumer protection laws (as in the Information condition)—increased
self-reported intentions to seek legal recourse compared to the Fraud & Fine
Print condition.
VI. Implications
Across four studies, we find that laypeople are deeply affected by fine-print
fraud. Study 1 shows that laypeople, unlike those with training in the law,
strongly believe that such contracts are consented to and will be enforced,
despite the seller’s material deception.103 Study 2 reveals that the presence of
conflicting fine print discourages consumers from wanting to take legal action,
file a complaint, or damage the firm’s reputation by telling others what
happened.104
Study 3 suggests that laypeople seem to focus predominantly on the
written terms of the finalized contract and discount defects in the contract
formation process. Indeed, we found that the presence or absence of deception
makes little difference to laypeople’s intuitions about whether the contract
will be, or should be, enforced as written. This finding holds true whether the
seller’s misrepresentation is made orally or printed in an advertisement, and
regardless of whether the consumer contract is an auto loan agreement, a phone
103. See supra Part II.B.
104. See supra Part III.B.
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plan, or a residential mortgage agreement. In general, it seems that consumers
believe that the written terms are what matters—and the fact that the seller
misrepresents a material fact makes little difference to lay legal predictions.105
Finally, Study 4 suggests that informing laypeople about antideception
consumer protection laws alters their perceptions about the legal and moral
status of contracts induced by fraud, although such information does not
completely eliminate their formalistic intuition that whatever the contract
says is the final word.106
As we turn to assessing the implications of these empirical findings, we
acknowledge that our studies have several limitations. First, our lay samples
are drawn from online labor pools; they are not randomly selected from the
U.S. population. Thus, our samples may differ in systematic and unidentified
ways from the general population of consumers. Future research should
examine whether the findings hold true with a nationally representative
sample. With that said, the labor pools we used have been validated by previous
research and have been shown to yield results that mirror those of other
methods, such as in-person studies and nationally representative samples.107
Second, some may worry that the survey experiment methodology we
used cannot fully capture how consumers behave in the “real world.” For
instance, survey respondents may misstate their propensity to act when
encountering fraudulent behavior. While we cannot rule out this possibility,
we note that our findings are consistent with data from the FTC showing
that consumers underreport fraud.108 Future work should examine actual
consumer behavior in addition to consumer behavioral intentions, to
complement the survey evidence presented here.
105. See supra Part IV.B.
106. See supra Part V.B.
107. See Alexander Coppock, Generalizing from Survey Experiments Conducted on Mechanical

Turk: A Replication Approach, 7 POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 613, 613-14 (2019) (finding that
results from fifteen replication experiments conducted from “convenience samples”
obtained via MTurk were similar to “national probability samples”). The key question
will be the extent to which the effects we examine here are heterogeneous across
different subgroups, and whether studies based on the general population are more or
less likely to yield the effects we document. As Alexander Coppock explains:
Some treatments of course have different effects for different subgroups and in such cases, an
estimate obtained from a convenience sample may not generalize well. . . . Crucially, simply
noting that convenience and probability samples differ in terms of their background
characteristics is not sufficient for dismissing the results of experiments conducted on
convenience samples.

Id. at 624.
108. See, e.g., KEITH B. ANDERSON, FTC, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES: AN FTC

SURVEY 80-81, 80 tbl.5-1 (2004), https://perma.cc/H23N-Q2UP (reporting that nearly a
third of defrauded consumers made no complaint whatsoever, and fewer than 10%
reported fraud to official sources such as local, state, or federal government, or to the
Better Business Bureau).
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A. Consumer Welfare and Policing Fraud
The findings presented in this Article indicate that laypeople are
overdeterred by conflicting fine print in light of their formalistic intuitions.109
As a result, defrauded consumers are often reluctant to take deceptive
companies to court.110 Moreover, the results suggest that lay consumers are
similarly disinclined to take nonlegal measures, such as complaining online or
telling their friends, once they read their contracts.111 These findings cast
doubt on prevailing accounts suggesting either that defrauded consumers will
take steps to punish the seller and recover their money,112 or that when
consumers fail to do so, it is a result of formal and practical barriers to litigation
such as class action waivers, small-dollar claims, and the complexity and
expense of the remedy process.113 This research indicates that consumer
psychology may be an independent reason why victims of fraud do not take
action. Laypeople assume that contracts are binding as written, and are
discouraged by fine print. They seem not to intuit that fraud undermines their
consent or mitigates their blameworthiness for failing to read a contract. This
aspect of consumer psychology may lead them to take their lumps rather than
challenge deceptive practices.
What can be done? Our findings suggest that if we educate consumers
about consumer protection statutes that allow for contract rescission on the
basis of fraud, consumers may adjust their perceptions. Study participants
given information about the law express more intention to pursue legal and
nonlegal recourse, and they are less likely to believe that a court would enforce
the written provision. Indeed, they even alter their fairness judgments and
consent evaluations, believing the surprising term to be less consensual and
more unfair.114
Yet, we should be cautious about inferring that educating the public will
have as great an effect in the real world as in the lab. Perhaps our experimental
109. See supra Parts II.B, IV.B.
110. See supra Part III.B.
111. See supra Part III.B.
112. See, e.g., BAIRD, supra note 55, at 123 (“A seller cannot promise the moon during the course

of selling a product and then seek to escape legal liability by adding terms in forms. . . .
The buyer can prevail without having to assert any rights under the contract.”); Steele,
supra note 13, at 1109-10.
113. Cf., e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 111, 112 (1991) (“The simple fact that litigation is a costly enterprise
provides a rich source of inefficiencies with which the tort system must grapple.”);
David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 74 (1983)
(observing that rising litigation costs are “a barrier to some and a problem for all
litigants”).
114. See supra Part V.B.
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setting rendered the information about applicable law more salient to
consumers than it would be if it were communicated through real-life
channels, such as the media or a governmental campaign. In real life, as
opposed to the lab, consumers are confronted with myriad disclosures and
educational campaigns.115 They may have difficulty incorporating relevant
legal information into their decisionmaking processes when they encounter
fraud-and-fine-print situations.
Moreover, our findings indicate that even with successful education
efforts, some consumers remain deterred by fine print. We found that even
when people are convinced that the law allows for rescission, the presence of
the fine print still colors their perceptions of whether there was consent and
whether it would be fair to enforce the written agreement.116
These findings carry implications for consumer protection laws.
Antideception statutes in most states enable consumers to bring suits to
enforce laws prohibiting deceptive business practices.117 Our results suggest,
however, that consumers are likely to underutilize their option to initiate
lawsuits, thanks to the interaction between consumer psychology and the fine
print. Consumers’ formalistic intuitions may discourage them from seeking
recourse—both legal and nonlegal—even when they recognize the injustice of
the deception they experienced.
We suggest that a suite of policy responses may be warranted, such as
statutory damages for fine-print fraud, fee-shifting provisions to encourage
lawyers to take up these cases on behalf of consumers, and class action fee
awards.118 Of course, sellers often insert class action waivers or arbitration
agreements into their boilerplate terms,119 which may undercut the effectiveness
115. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 11 (giving examples of ubiquitous

warnings that largely go ignored).
116. See supra Part V.B.
117. See CARTER, supra note 48, at 33 (“All state UDAP statutes now allow consumers to take

a fraudulent business to court for at least some violations of the state UDAP
statute . . . .”). But see id. at 33-34 (listing states where “consumers may have a general
right to enforce the [UDAP] statute, but the legislature has carved out some businesses
and immunized them from consumer suit, or carved out some provisions of the statute
and denied consumers the ability to enforce them”).
118. See generally id. at 36 (noting that “consumer fraud is often committed on a broad scale,
with a fraudulent product or scheme foisted on thousands of consumers” and that class
actions offer “an efficient way for consumers to obtain redress when an unfair or
deceptive practice affects many people,” especially when each individual suffers only a
small dollar loss).
119. See, e.g., Lisa Renee Pomerantz, Consumer Arbitration: Pre-Dispute Resolution Clauses and
Class Action Waivers, 71 DISP. RESOL. J., no. 2, 2016, at 63, 69 (noting that consumer
contracts of adhesion often include class action waivers and arbitration clauses, “which
present consumers with take-it-or-leave-it choices”); see also Jean R. Sternlight &
Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient
footnote continued on next page
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of class-wide remedies. There may therefore be a more substantial role for state
attorneys general and federal regulatory agencies such as the FTC and CFPB
to play in policing fraudulent business practices.120 Admittedly, public
enforcement and other measures designed to encourage plaintiffs’ lawyers to
get involved will often rely on consumers’ complaints—and consumers may be
dissuaded from complaining by the psychological processes we have
documented here.121 Therefore, these policy responses may need to be paired
with informational campaigns aimed to educate consumers about their legal
rights and remedies.
B. Consumer Contracts
Many commentators have pointed to pervasive nonreadership of
contracts and concluded that fine print is essentially white noise.122 Because
few consumers read contracts before signing them, boilerplate contract
language does not make a meaningful difference to consumers’ initial purchase
decisions.123 We show that fine print does ultimately matter: It exerts a
significant effect on consumers thanks to their commonsense intuitions about
the law. They believe that contracts are likely to be enforced as written—even
in cases where the contract was induced by fraud—and thus, they feel deterred
by fine print.
We find, in other words, that laypeople react to fraud in ways that differ from
the intuitions of legal professionals. Our concern is that policymakers, scholars,
and courts may understate the likelihood that fraud will proliferate unpunished.

120.

121.

122.
123.

Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 1 & 2, 2004, at
75, 75-76 (2004) (noting that “[c]ompanies are increasingly drafting arbitration clauses” to
“shield themselves from class action liability, either in court or in arbitration”); Jaimee
Conley, Note, Suing for Small Potatoes: Consumer Class Action Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements Distinguished by the Ninth Circuit, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 309, 309 (same).
Cf. Beales & Muris, supra note 36, at 2160 (“Notwithstanding the strengths of private
legal rights, seller misbehavior may not be deterred effectively in some circumstances—
such as when court enforcement is impractical or economically infeasible. When
market forces are insufficient and common law is ineffective, a public agency, such as
the FTC, may supplement these other institutions to preserve competition and protect
consumers.”).
See Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s Complaint
Mechanism, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 80 (2012) (“Relying on complaints to
gauge enforcement needs could lead to substantial underenforcement or inactivity. Just
as lack of awareness of their legal rights is a hindrance to litigation, so too does it limit
consumers’ belief that their experiences form the basis of valid complaints.”).
See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 546-48; Bakos et al., supra note 1, at 3;
Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 1, at 168.
See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 19, at 841-42 (stating that many consumers fail to read
contracts and that this leads to “ignor[ing] . . . standard forms and fail[ing] to shop for
favorable terms”).
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Conclusion
Our empirical studies show that fine print plays a crucial role in shaping
consumers’ perceptions: When a contract’s fine print contradicts prior,
fraudulent misrepresentations, many consumers feel bound by the written
terms notwithstanding the seller’s prior assertions.
These findings add to a growing body of work showing that laypeople are
contract formalists. They focus on the written terms of the contract and
downplay important defects in the formation process.
The results suggest that victims of deception may be disinclined to take
action, thanks to the demoralizing effect that fine print—even fine print that
conflicts with the seller’s deceptive statements—has on their sense of
entitlement to redress. Thus, we believe that consumer protection regimes that
rely on victims to initiate private claims are likely to be underutilized. While
the financial and logistical barriers to litigation have been well documented,
this Article’s findings point to consumer psychology as a distinct reason
underlying consumers’ failure to take action against fine-print fraud.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide the materials used in the four studies
discussed in this Article. For each, we have included the stimuli (the text
presented to study participants) and the dependent measures (the questions
posed to participants). Where relevant, we also provide supplemental analyses
that are specific to each study. The Appendix concludes with a discussion of
how participants’ demographic characteristics affect study results.
A. Materials for Study 1
1.

Stimuli

Participants were presented with the following text modeled after the
National Payment Network FTC proceeding:
William decides to buy a new car from an automobile dealership called Frank’s
Motors. On the day of his purchase, a salesperson from the dealership offers him a
five-year payment plan to finance the car.
The salesperson tells William that the program will “allow you to pay off your
loan without incurring any fees.” He shows William a flyer advertising the
program, which is called “Frank’s No Fee Financing.”
William enrolls in the program. Shortly after, he begins to notice that he is being
charged $2.99 in fees every time he makes a payment. This will add up to several
hundred dollars over the five years. He realizes that the plan actually ends up
costing more than it saves.
William contacts a Frank’s Motors representative and asks about these fees. The
representative informs him that Frank’s Motors charges a $2.99 fee every time he
makes a payment.
William checks the “Terms and Conditions” of the paperwork that he signed
when he enrolled in the program.
For participants in the Fraud & Fine Print condition:
The contract states that Frank’s Motors will charge a $2.99 fee every time
consumers make a payment.
For participants in the Fraud Only condition:
The contract is silent on whether Frank’s Motors will charge a $2.99 fee
every time consumers make a payment.
William did not read the terms before he signed the paperwork. He would not
have enrolled in the financing program if he had known that he would incur
these fees.
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2.

Dependent Measures

After reading the vignette, participants rated their agreement with a series
of statements, presented in random order, on a seven-point Likert scale
(ranging from 1 being “strongly disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree”):




A court would probably rule that William is legally required to pay the $2.99 fees.
William consented to paying the $2.99 fees.
It is fair to require William to pay the $2.99 fees.

3.

Supplemental Analyses

Study 1 manipulated whether the contract William signed contained a
fine-print term contradicting the misrepresentation. The presence of the fine
print made a significant difference to judgments of legal enforceability,124
consent,125 and fairness.126 Laypeople saw higher levels of legal enforceability,
consent, and fairness overall, whereas legally trained people viewed the
contracts as more suspect. There was no significant interaction between the
variables representing the presence of fine print and the level of legal training
for any of the three measures.127
B. Materials for Study 2
1.

Stimuli

Participants were presented with the following text modeled after the
National Payment Network FTC proceeding:
Jennifer has been in the market for a new car for many months. She decides to
buy a Honda Civic from the FNP Automobile Dealership. On the day of her
purchase, a salesperson from FNP offers her various “add-on” products and
services. One of the add-on services is a financing contract called “FNP Saves” that
would change the way she pays off her car loan.
Normally, Jennifer would make one loan payment each month, but under the
“FNP Saves” program she would make one payment every two weeks. This
schedule, according to the FNP salesperson, would enable her to pay off the loan
approximately six months earlier. The FNP salesperson tells her that enrolling in
the “FNP Saves” program saves money on auto loans over time, because paying
the loan faster reduces the interest on the loan.
Jennifer decides to enroll. She signs a five-year financing contract with FNP,
enrolling in the “FNP Saves” program. She drives her new car off the lot that day.
124. F (1, 216) = 25.38, p < 0.001. For an overview of analysis of variance, see LEVINE, supra

note 75, at 329-30.
125. F (1, 216) = 17.41, p < 0.001.
126. F (1, 215) = 7.55, p = 0.007.
127. All p > 0.30.
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A few months later, Jennifer notices that FNP has been deducting small amounts
here and there from her checking account. It seems like every two weeks they
deducted $2.99. She calls FNP to ask why she is seeing these deductions. The FNP
account manager on the phone explains that FNP charges a “per-debit” fee every
time it makes a debit from customers’ bank accounts.
Jennifer pulls up the contract she signed.
For participants in the Fraud & Fine Print condition:
The contract states that FNP will charge a “per-debit” fee of $2.99 every time
it debits the account. It also mentions a termination fee of $200 if she cancels
the contract before the end of five years.
For participants in the Fraud Only condition:
The contract says nothing about a “per-debit” fee. It only mentions a
termination fee of $200 if she cancels the contract before the end of five
years.
Jennifer quickly does the math: she realizes that she will pay at least an extra $350
over the five-year program due to the $2.99 per-debit fees. Despite what the
salesperson had told her at the dealership, she realizes that the “FNP Saves”
program does not save money over the long run once these fees are taken into
account.
Jennifer asks to quit the contract, but the account manager on the phone says that
the contract is binding over the five-year period, and that if she wants to cancel
early, she will have to pay a $200 termination fee.

2.

Dependent Measures

After reading the vignette, participants rated their agreement with a series
of statements, presented in random order, on a seven-point Likert scale
(ranging from 1 being “strongly disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree”):




Jennifer consented to pay the $2.99 per-debit fees.
Jennifer is legally required to either continue paying the $2.99 per-debit fees,
or else pay the $200 termination fee.
It is fair to require Jennifer to either continue paying the $2.99 per-debit fees,
or else pay the $200 termination fee.

Finally, participants answered an open-ended question asking, “If you were
Jennifer, what would you do in this situation?”
3.

Supplemental Analyses

Study 2 manipulated whether the contract Jennifer signed as a result of the
seller’s misrepresentation contained a fine-print term contradicting the
misrepresentation. As Figure 5 shows, the presence versus absence of the fineprint disclosure makes a significant difference across all three dependent
variables.
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Participants more strongly felt that Jennifer consented to pay the fees
when the written agreement contained a provision allowing the company to
charge the per-debit fees128 than when it did not.129 Legally, they more
strongly believed that Jennifer was required to pay the fees in the Fraud & Fine
Print condition130 than in the Fraud Only condition.131 Morally, they felt that
it was more legitimate and fair to require her to pay the fees when she received
the disclosure132 than when she did not.133
Figure 5
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bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.

128. M = 4.81, SD = 1.72.
129. M = 1.56, SD = 1.20, twelch(91.54) = 11.03, p < 0.001, d = 2.18. For an overview of Cohen’s d

130.
131.
132.
133.

as a measurement of effect size, see FREDERICK J GRAVETTER & LARRY B. WALLNAU,
STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 262 (9th ed. 2013).
M = 5.87, SD = 1.39.
M = 3.31, SD = 2.14, twelch(79.60) = 7.03, p < 0.001, d = 1.43.
M = 3.27, SD = 1.99.
M = 1.73, SD = 1.54, t (98) = 4.30, p < 0.001, d = 0.86.
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C. Materials for Study 3
1.

Telecommunications case

Participants assigned to the telecommunications case were presented with
the following text modeled after Chapman v. Skype. Italics indicate text that
varied across the conditions.
For participants in the Fine Print Only condition:
Melissa purchases an international calling plan from ACME, a
telecommunications company. The plan comes with a “Fair Usage Policy,” which
states: “The plan is limited to 1,000 minutes per month. Calls in excess of this limit
will incur the normal rates and connection fees.”
Melissa would not have bought the plan if she had known that it was limited
to 1,000 minutes per month. A few months after purchasing the plan, she
notices that her credit card was charged “overage fees” for exceeding her
monthly limit. She contacts ACME and asks a representative about the fees
on her credit card statement.
The representative informs her that the plan is limited to 1,000 minutes per month.
He refers her to ACME’s “Fair Usage Policy,” which she clicked through months ago
when she completed the purchase, without reading.
For participants in the Fraud & Fine Print condition:
Melissa purchases an international calling plan from ACME, a
telecommunications company. The plan is advertised as “Unlimited World,” and
is described in promotional ads as “allowing unlimited phone calls to multiple
destinations.” In fact, the plan comes with a “Fair Usage Policy,” which states: “The
plan is limited to 1,000 minutes per month. Calls in excess of this limit will incur the
normal rates and connection fees.”
Melissa would not have bought the plan if she had known that it was limited
to 1,000 minutes per month. A few months after purchasing the plan, she
notices that her credit card was charged “overage fees” for exceeding her
monthly limit. She contacts ACME and asks a representative about the fees
on her credit card statement.
The representative informs her that the “Unlimited World” plan is limited to 1,000
minutes per month. He refers her to ACME’s “Fair Usage Policy,” which she clicked
through months ago when she completed the purchase, without reading.
For participants in the Fraud Only condition:
Melissa purchases an international calling plan from ACME, a
telecommunications company. The plan is advertised as “Unlimited World,” and
is described in promotional ads as “allowing unlimited phone calls to multiple
destinations.” In fact, the plan is limited to 1,000 minutes per month. Calls in excess
of this limit incur the normal rates and connection fees.
Melissa would not have bought the plan if she had known that it was limited
to 1,000 minutes per month. A few months after purchasing the plan, she
notices that her credit card was charged “overage fees” for exceeding her
monthly limit. She contacts ACME and asks a representative about the fees
on her credit card statement.
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The representative informs her that the “Unlimited World” plan is limited to 1,000
minutes per month. Melissa finds ACME’s “Fair Usage Policy,” which she clicked
through months ago when she completed the purchase, without reading. The Fair
Use Policy says nothing about how many minutes customers can use per month.

Participants were asked the following questions (in random order) and
presented with a seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 being “strongly
disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree”):







A court would probably rule that Melissa is legally required to pay the
overage fee.
Melissa consented to pay the overage fee.
Melissa had fair notice about the overage fee.
It is fair to require Melissa to pay the overage fee.
Melissa was reasonable in assuming that she would not have to pay overage
fees for placing over 1,000 minutes of calls.
Manipulation check: The agreement with ACME that Melissa clicked through
before completing her purchase stated that calls would be limited to 1,000
minutes per month.

Finally, they were asked to give a free response to the question: “If you were
Melissa, what would you do in this situation?”
2.

Home mortgage case

Participants assigned to the home mortgage case were presented with the
following text modeled after Davis v. G.N. Mortgage Corp.:
For participants in the Fine Print Only condition:
Cathy and Thomas take out a loan from GNMC to finance their new home,
with the help of a GNMC loan officer. The mortgage agreement that Cathy and
Thomas signed states that GNMC’s borrowers incur a prepayment penalty of
$12,000 if they refinance their loan within 5 years. Cathy and Thomas would not
have taken out the GNMC mortgage if they had known that they would
have to pay a prepayment penalty for refinancing within 5 years. This is
because they knew there was a chance they would need to move to another
city before the end of 5 years.
Four years later, they need to repay the balance on their mortgage so that
they can move to another city. They are assessed a $12,000 prepayment
penalty by GNMC.
When they contact GNMC to ask about the penalty, the representative on
the phone informs them that the penalty is triggered for any refinancing
within 5 years. He refers them to the GNMC mortgage they signed years ago,
without reading.
For participants in the Fraud & Fine Print condition:
Cathy and Thomas take out a loan from GNMC to finance their new home,
with the help of a GNMC loan officer. The loan officer describes the GNMC
mortgage as having “lenient prepayment penalties.” The loan officer tells them: “You
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only have to pay a prepayment penalty if you refinance your loan within 3 years.”
In fact, the mortgage agreement that Cathy and Thomas signed states that GNMC’s
borrowers incur a prepayment penalty of $12,000 if they refinance their loan within
5 years. Cathy and Thomas would not have taken out the GNMC mortgage if
they had known that they would have to pay a prepayment penalty for
refinancing within 5 years. This is because they knew there was a chance
they would need to move to another city before the end of 5 years.
Four years later, they need to repay the balance on their mortgage so that
they can move to another city. They are assessed a $12,000 prepayment
penalty by GNMC.
When they contact GNMC to ask about the penalty, the representative on
the phone informs them that the penalty is triggered for any refinancing
within 5 years. He refers them to the GNMC mortgage they signed years ago,
without reading.
For participants in the Fraud Only condition:
Cathy and Thomas take out a loan from GNMC to finance their new home,
with the help of a GNMC loan officer. The loan officer describes the GNMC
mortgage as having “lenient prepayment penalties.” The loan officer tells them: “You
only have to pay a prepayment penalty if you refinance your loan within 3 years.”
In fact, GNMC’s borrowers incur a prepayment penalty of $12,000 if they refinance
their loan within 5 years. Cathy and Thomas would not have taken out the
GNMC mortgage if they had known that they would have to pay a
prepayment penalty for refinancing within 5 years. This is because they
knew there was a chance they would need to move to another city before the
end of 5 years.
Four years later, they need to repay the balance on their mortgage so that
they can move to another city. They are assessed a $12,000 prepayment
penalty by GNMC.
When they contact GNMC to ask about the penalty, the representative on
the phone informs them that the penalty is triggered for any refinancing
within 5 years. Cathy and Thomas examine the GNMC mortgage signed years
ago, without reading. It says nothing about how long before the prepayment penalty
period expires.

Participants were asked the following questions (in random order) and
presented with a seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 being “strongly
disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree”):






A court would probably rule that Cathy and Thomas are legally required to
pay the prepayment penalty.
Cathy and Thomas consented to pay the prepayment penalty.
Cathy and Thomas had fair notice about the prepayment penalty.
It is fair to require Cathy and Thomas to pay the prepayment penalty.
Cathy and Thomas were reasonable in assuming that they would not have to
pay a prepayment penalty for refinancing after four years.
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Manipulation check: The mortgage agreement that Cathy and Thomas signed
with GNMC stated that the prepayment penalty would be triggered for any
refinancing within 5 years.

Finally, they were asked to give a free response to the question: “If you were
Cathy and Thomas, what would you do in this situation?”
3.

Auto loan case

Participants assigned to the telecommunications case were presented with
the following text modeled after the National Payment Network FTC
proceeding:
For participants in the Fine Print Only condition:
William decides to buy a new car from the FNP Automobile Dealership. On
the day of his purchase, a salesperson from FNP offers him various add-on
products and services. One of the add-on services is a five-year payment
program that is supposed to help customers finance their cars, by making
biweekly debits from their bank accounts. The program charges a $200
early-termination penalty if a customer decides to quit the program before
the end of five years.
The contract William signs to enroll in the program states in the “Terms and
Conditions” that FNP will charge a “per-debit fee” of $2.99 every time it debits his
bank account. William would not have enrolled in the program if he had
known that he would incur per-debit fees.
After enrolling in the program, he begins to notice that he is being charged
$2.99 every two weeks, each time FNP debits his account, which will add up
to several hundred dollars over the years. Therefore, the plan actually ends
up costing more than it saves.
He contacts an FNP representative and asks her about these fees. The
representative informs him that FNP charges a per-debit fee of $2.99 every
time it debits his account. The representative refers him to the FNP’s “Terms and
Conditions” in the paperwork that he signed, without reading, when he enrolled in
the program. William asks to quit the program, but the representative says
that if he wants to quit before the end of five years, he will have to pay the
$200 early-termination penalty.
For participants in the Fraud & Fine Print condition:
William decides to buy a new car from the FNP Automobile Dealership. On
the day of his purchase, a salesperson from FNP offers him various add-on
products and services. One of the add-on services is a five-year payment
program that is supposed to help customers finance their cars, by making
biweekly debits from their bank accounts. The program charges a $200
early-termination penalty if a customer decides to quit the program before
the end of five years.
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The sales person tells William that the program, called “FNP SAVES,” will “allow
you to pay off your loan without incurring any fees.” In fact, the contract William
signs to enroll in the program states in the “Terms and Conditions” that FNP will
charge a “per-debit fee” of $2.99 every time it debits his bank account. William
would not have enrolled in the FNP SAVES program if he had known that
he would incur per-debit fees.
After enrolling in the program, he begins to notice that he is being charged
$2.99 every two weeks, each time FNP debits his account, which will add up
to several hundred dollars over the years. Therefore, the plan actually ends
up costing more than it saves.
He contacts an FNP representative and asks her about these fees. The
representative informs him that FNP charges a per-debit fee of $2.99 every
time it debits his account. The representative refers him to the FNP’s “Terms and
Conditions” in the paperwork that he signed, without reading, when he enrolled in
the program. William asks to quit the program, but the representative says
that if he wants to quit before the end of five years, he will have to pay the
$200 early-termination penalty.
For participants in the Fraud Only condition:
William decides to buy a new car from the FNP Automobile Dealership. On
the day of his purchase, a salesperson from FNP offers him various add-on
products and services. One of the add-on services is a five-year payment
program that is supposed to help customers finance their cars, by making
biweekly debits from their bank accounts. The program charges a $200
early-termination penalty if a customer decides to quit the program before
the end of five years.
The salesperson tells William that the program, called “FNP SAVES,” will “allow
you to pay off your loan without incurring any fees.” In fact, FNP charges a “perdebit fee” of $2.99 every time it debits his bank account. William would not have
enrolled in the FNP SAVES program if he had known that he would incur
per-debit fees.
After enrolling in the program, he begins to notice that he is being charged
$2.99 every two weeks, each time FNP debits his account, which will add up
to several hundred dollars over the years. Therefore, the plan actually ends
up costing more than it saves.
He contacts an FNP representative and asks her about these fees. The
representative informs him that FNP charges a per-debit fee of $2.99 every
time it debits his account. William looks at the paperwork that he signed, without
reading, when he enrolled in the program. The paperwork says nothing about
whether there will be fees. William asks to quit the program, but the
representative says that if he wants to quit before the end of five years, he
will have to pay the $200 early-termination penalty.
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Participants were asked the following questions (in random order) and
presented with a seven-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 being “strongly
disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree”):







A court would probably rule that William is legally required to pay the perdebit fees (or else pay the $200 early termination penalty).
William consented to paying the per-debit fees.
William had fair notice about the per-debit fees.
It is fair to require William to pay the per-debit fees (or else pay the $200
early termination penalty).
William was reasonable in assuming that he would not have to pay per-debit
fees.
Manipulation check: The contract that William signed with FNP before enrolling
in the program stated that he would be charged per-debit fees of $2.99.

Finally, they were asked to give a free response to the question: “If you were
William, what would you do in this situation?”
D. Materials for Study 4
1.

Stimuli

Participants were presented with the following text modeled after the
National Payment Network FTC proceeding. Italics indicate text that varied
across the conditions.
For participants in the Information Condition:
William decides to buy a new car from the SVP Automobile Dealership. On
the day of his purchase, a salesperson from SVP offers him various add-on
products and services. One of the add-on services is a five-year payment
program that is supposed to help customers finance their cars, by making
biweekly debits from their bank accounts. The program charges a $200
early-termination penalty if a customer decides to quit the program before
the end of five years.
The sales person tells William that the program, called “SVP SAVES,” will
“allow you to pay off your loan without incurring any fees.” In fact, the
contract William signs to enroll in the program states in the “Terms and
Conditions” that SVP will charge a “per-debit fee” of $2.99 every time it debits his
bank account. William would not have enrolled in the SVP SAVES program if
he had known that he would incur per-debit fees.
After enrolling in the program, he begins to notice that he is being charged
$2.99 every two weeks, each time SVP debits his account, which will add up
to several hundred dollars over the years. Therefore, the plan actually ends
up costing more than it saves.
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He contacts an SVP representative and asks her about these fees. The
representative informs him that SVP charges a per-debit fee of $2.99 every
time it debits his account. The representative refers him to the SVP’s “Terms and
Conditions” in the paperwork that he signed, without reading, when he enrolled in
the program. William asks to quit the program, but the representative says
that if he wants to quit before the end of five years, he will have to pay the
$200 early-termination penalty.
Now we’d like to tell you about the consumer protection laws in the state where
William lives. In William’s state, a person may be able to get out of a contract if a
court finds that the person relied on a deceptive statement made by the seller before
the consumer signed the contract. This could happen even if the seller’s deceptive
statement is contradicted by what is written in the contract.
For participants in the Fraud Only Condition:
William decides to buy a new car from the SVP Automobile Dealership. On
the day of his purchase, a salesperson from SVP offers him various add-on
products and services. One of the add-on services is a five-year payment
program that is supposed to help customers finance their cars, by making
biweekly debits from their bank accounts. The program charges a $200
early-termination penalty if a customer decides to quit the program before
the end of five years.
The salesperson tells William that the program, called “SVP SAVES,” will
“allow you to pay off your loan without incurring any fees.” In fact, SVP
charges a “per-debit fee” of $2.99 every time it debits his bank account. William
would not have enrolled in the SVP SAVES program if he had known that
he would incur per-debit fees.
After enrolling in the program, he begins to notice that he is being charged
$2.99 every two weeks, each time SVP debits his account, which will add up
to several hundred dollars over the years. Therefore, the plan actually ends
up costing more than it saves.
He contacts an SVP representative and asks her about these fees. The
representative informs him that SVP charges a per-debit fee of $2.99 every
time it debits his account. William looks at the paperwork that he signed, without
reading, when he enrolled in the program. The paperwork says nothing about
whether there will be fees. William asks to quit the program, but the
representative says that if he wants to quit before the end of five years, he
will have to pay the $200 early-termination penalty.
For participants in the Fraud & Fine Print Condition:
William decides to buy a new car from the SVP Automobile Dealership. On
the day of his purchase, a salesperson from SVP offers him various add-on
products and services. One of the add-on services is a five-year payment
program that is supposed to help customers finance their cars, by making
biweekly debits from their bank accounts. The program charges a $200
early-termination penalty if a customer decides to quit the program before
the end of five years.
The sales person tells William that the program, called “SVP SAVES,” will
“allow you to pay off your loan without incurring any fees.” In fact, the
contract William signs to enroll in the program states in the “Terms and
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Conditions” that SVP will charge a “per-debit fee” of $2.99 every time it debits his
bank account. William would not have enrolled in the SVP SAVES program if
he had known that he would incur per-debit fees.
After enrolling in the program, he begins to notice that he is being charged
$2.99 every two weeks, each time SVP debits his account, which will add up
to several hundred dollars over the years. Therefore, the plan actually ends
up costing more than it saves.
He contacts an SVP representative and asks her about these fees. The
representative informs him that SVP charges a per-debit fee of $2.99 every
time it debits his account. The representative refers him to the SVP’s “Terms and
Conditions” in the paperwork that he signed, without reading, when he enrolled in
the program. William asks to quit the program, but the representative says
that if he wants to quit before the end of five years, he will have to pay the
$200 early-termination penalty.

2.

Dependent Measures

After participants finished reading the scenario, they were first asked an
open-ended question: “If you were William, what would you do in this
situation?” They reported their free responses in a text box.
Next, they were asked, “If you were William, how likely would you be to
take this matter to court?” They rated their response on a seven-point Likert
scale (ranging from 1 being “extremely unlikely” to 7 being “extremely likely”).
Next, participants rated their agreement with a series of statements,
presented in random order, on seven-point Likert scales (ranging from 1 being
“strongly disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree”):




A court would probably rule that William is legally required to pay the perdebit fees (or else pay the $200 early termination penalty).
It is fair to require William to pay the per-debit fees (or else pay the $200
early termination penalty).
William consented to paying the per-debit fees.

Finally, participants recorded their responses to two manipulation check
questions:



The contract that William signed with FNP before enrolling in the program
stated that he would be charged per-debit fees of $2.99. (Yes/No)
According to the law in William’s state, a person might be able to get out of a
contract if they relied on a deceptive statement made by the seller before
they signed the contract, even though the written contract terms contradict
the seller’s statement. (Probably true/Probably false)
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4.

Supplemental Analyses

In the main text of the Article, we analyzed only those 264 participants
who passed the manipulation check and reported no legal training or
background. In Table 4 we also report the findings with all participants
included (n = 300).
Table 4
Effect of Applying Exclusion Criteria

Question and
Condition

All Participants
Included
(n = 300)

Excluding Participants
Who Failed the
Manipulation Check
(n = 264)

M
(SD)
M
(SD)
If you were William, how likely would you be to take this matter to court?
Information
5.04a
(1.95)
5.05a
(1.93)
b
b
Fraud & Fine Print
3.89
(2.02)
3.77
(1.99)
a
a
Fraud Only
5.36
(1.44)
5.45
(1.36)
A court would probably rule that William is legally required to pay the per-debit fees.
Information
3.27a
(1.52)
3.29a
(1.51)
b
b
Fraud & Fine Print
5.22
(1.71)
5.27
(1.73)
a
c
Fraud Only
3.02
(1.77)
2.82
(1.66)
It is fair to require William to pay the per-debit fees.
Information
2.31a
(1.63)
2.29a
(1.59)
b
b
Fraud & Fine Print
3.13
(1.99)
3.18
(1.99)
c
c
Fraud Only
1.81
(1.25)
1.66
(1.11)
William consented to paying the per-debit fees.
Information
3.51a
(1.87)
3.49a
(1.89)
b
b
Fraud & Fine Print
4.11
(2.13)
4.15
(2.16)
c
c
Fraud Only
2.11
(1.67)
1.82
(1.41)
Shared superscripts within each question indicate that numbers do not differ
from one another to a statistically significant degree.
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E. Demographic Differences
We asked lay participants to report their gender, age, race, income level,
education level, and political orientation. Here we report demographic
variation in responses. Unfortunately, we were not able to record demographic
information for the sample of lawyers and law students, given the time
constraints of surveying attendees during alumni reunion events.
Study 1 found that gender made a difference to MTurk respondents’
overall views that the contract is binding. Men saw the consumer as less bound
than did women. The average rating among male participants was 3.93
(SD = 1.30) whereas the average rating among female participants was 5.06
(SD = 1.16), a significant difference, t(54) = 3.44, p = 0.001, d = 93.
Study 2 found that age made a difference to overall views that the contract
is binding. Older participants were inclined to see the consumer as
significantly less bound (r = 0.27).134 The effect of age did not vary by condition,
however, meaning that older participants were inclined to see the consumer as
less required to pay the per-debit fees, whether or not the agreements
contained the written term disclosing the fee.
Study 3 found that race made a difference to overall views that the
contract is binding, collapsing across scenarios. Nonwhite participants were
inclined to see the consumer as more bound, t(149) = 1.98, p = 0.050. The effect
of race did not vary by condition, however, meaning that white participants
were less inclined to see the consumer as required to pay the hidden fees than
were nonwhite participants, regardless of whether or not there was fraud, and
regardless of whether or not the agreements contained the written term
disclosing the fee.
Study 4 found that political orientation (measured on a seven-point scale
ranging from 1 being “extremely liberal” to 7 being “extremely conservative”)
made a difference to overall views that the contract is binding. Conservative
participants were inclined to see the consumer as significantly more bound
(r = 0.14). The effect of political orientation did not vary by condition,
however, meaning that conservative participants were inclined to see the
consumer as more required to pay the per-debit fees—whether or not the
agreements contained the written term disclosing the fee, and whether or not
they were told about the consumer protection laws in William’s state.

134. For an overview of the correlation coefficient r, see Chin-Chung (Joy) Chao, Pearson

Correlation, in 1 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATION RESEARCH METHODS 267
(Mike Allen ed., 2017).
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